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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v* 
COREY LYNN BROOKS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No- 920853-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Corey Lynn Brooks appeals his convictions of 
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-302 and 76-6-203 (1990), both first degree 
felonies, entered upon jury verdicts, and possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (Supp. 1992), a second degree felony, 
entered upon a bench verdict. The convictions were entered by 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding. The Utah Supreme Court 
had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) 
(1992). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992), 
the supreme court transferred this appeal to this Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Do the principles of either "plain error" or 
"ineffective assistance of counsel" overcome defendant's trial-
level waiver of jury selection issues, such that a new trial 
should be ordered? Absent post-trial evidentiary proceedings, 
appellate review for plain error or counsel ineffectiveness is 
necessarily conducted de novo, without reference to traditional 
standards of review, upon examination of the underlying trial 
record. See State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174-75 (Utah App. 
1992), and authorities cited therein. 
2. Was defendant permissibly convicted of both 
aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, where the same 
criminal episode included both a home entry and a taking of 
property by force or fear? Properly framed, this question asks 
whether, upon examining the defining statutes, either the 
burglary or the robbery is a lesser included offense within the 
other, such that defendant could not properly be convicted of 
both. As such, it is a question of law, reviewed without 
deference to the trial court. See State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 
874, 877 (Utah 1985). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Many of the pertinent constitutional provisions, 
statutes, and rules are set forth in Appendix 1 to defendant's 
opening Brief of Appellant. Utah's Jury Selection and Service 
Act, Utah Code Ann. SS 78-46-1 through -23 (1992), containing 
additional pertinent law in effect at the time of defendant's 
March 1992 trial, is reproduced in Appendix I of this brief, as 
is Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, the 
"distribution of powers" provision• 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As set forth in his Brief of Appellant, defendant's 
first trial on the aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary 
charges resulted in a hung jury, and a mistrial ruling (R. 36). 
Defendant then obtained new counsel, and was re-tried (R. 79, 
261-847).l Upon re-trial, the jury found defendant guilty of 
both charges (R. 203-04). Because defendant used a gun to commit 
the offenses, and because he was on parole when he committed 
them, the trial court then found defendant guilty of the 
additional offense of possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person (R. 610). 
Defendant was sentenced concurrently for each offense, 
plus ordered to pay fines and make restitution; a consecutive 
firearm enhancement was added. These sentences were imposed to 
run consecutive to another, uncompleted sentence at the Utah 
State Prison (R. 210-17). Trial counsel then withdrew, and the 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association resumed defendant's 
representation for this appeal (R. 224-26). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Offenses 
The evidence supporting the jury's verdict is fairly 
straightforward.2 Defendant responded to a classified 
*The State parenthetically references the trial transcript 
(R. 261-847) by its contiguous numbering with the main record. 
2,,In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable 
to the verdict." State v. Seale, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 11 (Utah 
Feb. 24, 1993) (citing authorities). 
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advertisement placed by Stephanie Vert, offering a distinctive 
"marquise" diamond ring for sale (R. 340-44, 441-42). He 
examined the ring at the Vert home, spending thirty to forty-five 
minutes in the company of Stephanie Vert and her mother, Martha 
Vert (R. 346, 445). During this visit, defendant carried a large 
"walkie-talkie" (R. 346, 446). Defendant told the Verts that he 
wished to purchase the ring, and made arrangements to return to 
their home the next morning for that purpose (R. 347, 446). 
Stephanie Vert was the only person home when defendant 
returned the next morning (R. 448-49). Defendant still carried 
the walkie-talkie, and was wearing a hat, gloves, and "rainbow"-
type sunglasses (R. 450-52). Stephanie let defendant into the 
home and offered him some coffee. Defendant picked up the 
diamond ring, then pointed a pistol at Stephanie and ordered her 
to crawl into a bathroom (R. 452). When she complied, defendant 
produced handcuffs and ordered Stephanie to cuff herself to 
plumbing beneath the sink. When she initially "did it wrong," 
defendant produced handcuff keys and made Stephanie re-cuff 
herself. He then threatened her, "You better not remember what I 
look like" (R. 453-54). 
Defendant spent ten to twelve minutes rummaging about 
the Vert home (R. 457). Using the walkie-talkie, he spoke to an 
apparent accomplice, arranging to be picked up outside the home 
(R. 455-56).3 When defendant left, Stephanie freed herself by 
defendant and the accomplice, Mark McGrath, had assisted 
another friend in the purchase of a pistol about a week before 
the robbery (R. 503-09, 561, 678-81). The inference drawn by the 
4 
unscrewing the plumbing, and summoned help (R. 457). Upon 
inspection, the Verts estimated that defendant had stolen several 
thousand dollars' worth of jewelry, including the diamond ring, 
from their home (R. 354-61). 
A day or two before the robbery, defendant had visited 
a friend (R. 485). He had two pairs of handcuffs with him at 
that time, one of which he had briefly placed on his friend's 
young child. The friend had also handled the cuffs, and 
defendant talked about wiping fingerprints from them (R. 488). 
Shortly after the robbery—apparently the same day— 
defendant visited some other friends (R. 568-71, 642-43). During 
this visit, defendant displayed some jewelry, including a 
marquise diamond ring, offering to sell the jewelry to these 
friends (R. 572-73, 578, 644-45, 697-98). Also during the visit, 
defendant and his friends saw a television account of the Vert 
robbery. To one of these friends, defendant boasted that he had 
committed the robbery (R. 648-50). At the end of this visit, 
defendant gave one item of jewelry—a gold or gold-plated chain— 
to his friends (R. 573, 647). The friends subsequently called 
the police, and turned the chain over to them (R. 574-77, 650). 
Martha Vert later identified the chain as one of the items taken 
from her home (R. 357-58). This was apparently the only stolen 
item that was recovered (R. 357). 
prosecution was that the pistol was purchased for defendant and 
McGrath, and was used in the robbery (R. 837-38). 
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Stephanie Vert's identification of defendant as the 
robber was positive in several respects. On the day of the 
robbery, she told investigating police officers that the robber 
had a silver tooth. When arrested, defendant had a silver tooth 
(R. 637, 743-44, 750). About a week after the robbery, Stephanie 
quickly identified defendant from a photo array (R. 745, 747). 
Several months after that, she viewed a live lineup, and again 
unhesitatingly identified defendant as the robber (R. 458-59).* 
Martha Vert had more difficulty identifying defendant 
from the photo array than did Stephanie. At the lineup, however, 
Martha identified defendant as the person who had examined the 
diamond ring on the night before the robbery (R. 347, 510-11). 
Jury Selection 
Because defendant's "plain error" and "counsel 
ineffectiveness" arguments focus on jury selection, a separate 
overview of that procedure is appropriate. Jury selection began 
with a panel of twenty-two prospective jurors (R. 151-52). 
Initial voir dire covered possible panelist acquaintance with the 
parties, court personnel, attorneys, and witnesses (R. 263-67). 
The trial court explained the charges, and ascertained that no 
panelists had heard about the case against defendant (R. 268). 
Predicting a four-day trial, the court asked the 
panelists whether they had any personal matters that might 
^Represented by counsel, defendant was readily identified 
from the lineup, which included seven other similarly-attired, 
fairly similar-appearing young men (State's Exhibit 14 at 9, 17, 
and photograph Exhibits 15-24, admitted into evidence at R. 759-
60, and contained in record envelope). 
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conflict with their jury service (R. 268; the pertinent portions 
of juror voir dire are reproduced in Appendix II of this brief). 
Panelist Frank Barber responded that he was obliged to transport 
his wife to physical therapy three times per week (R. 268-69)• 
The trial court asked Barber to try to change the therapy 
schedule, or to make other transportation arrangements, and 
assured Barber that the trial proceedings would recess on time to 
accommodate his needs. Barber responded, "I am not sure that I 
could devote my undivided attention to the case under the 
circumstances" (R. 269-70). However, Barber said nothing to 
indicate that he would be biased toward either the defense or the 
prosecution for any reason. 
An engineer employed by a computer company, and who had 
no prior jury experience, Barber did sit on the trial jury (R. 
156, 281). The original record on appeal does not reveal whether 
Barber resolved his schedule conflict. However, juror Barber 
subsequently executed an affidavit stating that he did arrange to 
accommodate both the trial schedule and his wife's therapy 
appointments. Reference to that affidavit should not be critical 
to the resolution of this appeal. However, in the event this 
Court deems otherwise, this brief is accompanied by a motion to 
supplement the record on appeal with Barber's affidavit (the 
affidavit and motion are copied at Appendix III of this brief). 
The trial court asked the panelists whether they had 
ever been subjected to assaults or threats, as would accompany a 
robbery; it then expanded this query to include experience as 
7 
burglary victims (R. 306, 308). Several panelists responded 
affirmatively. 
Panelist Larry Pike stated, "As a child, our home was 
burglarized when we were there" (R. 310). At the time of 
defendant's trial, Pike was married, was a master's-level 
electrical engineer and the father of two children; he also had 
past jury experience (R. 274-75). Pike indicated no problem when 
the trial court asked the crime-experienced panelists whether 
they could try this case impartially (R. 310-311). Pike sat on 
the trial jury (R. 156). 
Panelist Daniel Heap stated, "I've had my house broke 
into before, and our vehicles twice in the last couple of years" 
(R. 309-10). Heap, married with two grown children, was a long-
time "fleet maintenance" worker for Salt Lake County; this was 
his first jury duty (R. 276-77). He also did not report any 
possible bias stemming from his experience as a crime victim (R. 
309-10), and also sat on defendant's trial jury (R. 156). 
Panelist Phyllis Geurts reported, "On two different 
occasions we've had somebody walk in our unlocked back door and 
take my purse" (R. 309). A self-described "stay-at-home mother," 
Geurts was a first-time jury panelist (R. 278). She was 
interviewed in chambers because her husband had been a defense 
witness in another criminal case, prosecuted by the same 
prosecutor responsible for this trial. The prosecutor also 
believed that he and Mrs. Geurts might have lived in the same 
church ward at some time (R. 314-15). Questioned by defense 
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counsel, Geurts stated that these factors would not affect her 
impartiality (R. 315). Geurts did not sit, for she was removed 
by a defense peremptory challenge (R. 151). 
The only two panelists who had themselves been victims 
of violent crime—Alta Ludlow and Debra Trump—were called into 
chambers for followup voir dire.5 Besides having been an 
assault victim, panelist Ludlow had endured several burglaries 
(R. 319-20). Asked if these experiences would affect her as a 
juror, she stated: "I really don't know. I mean, just talking 
about it makes me feel kind of sick. I think if somebody tried 
to hurt me, or, you know, if I were to put myself in, say, the 
victim's circumstances, I might just decide because I know how it 
feels" (R. 320). Defense counsel followed up on this comment, 
asking Ludlow whether her past experience might "cloud [her] 
judgment." She responded: "It would be hard. I'll be honest" 
(R. 321). Accordingly, the parties and the court agreed to 
strike Ludlow for cause (R. 324). 
Panelist Debra Trump, a bank teller, related her 
experience as a bank robbery victim (R. 315-16). Defense counsel 
quizzed her about another experience—picking a forgery suspect 
from a lineup (R. 317-18). In light of both experiences, Trump 
3By "victims of violent crime," the State means persons who 
had been personally assaulted or threatened. This includes Ms. 
Ludlow, who herself had been assaulted (R. 307), and Ms. Trump, 
who had been on-duty as a teller during a bank robbery (R. 308). 
Panelists Roatcap, Rhodes, Sandberg, and Christensen had friends 
or relatives who had been assaulted or robbed (R. 307-09), but 
were not themselves victims. Panelists Ludlow, Pickering, 
Woodside, Geurts, Heap, and Pike had been victims of burglary 
unattended by personal violence (R. 307-10). 
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asserted an ability to try this case impartially (R. 316, 318-
19). Rather far down the jury list, however, Trump did not sit 
as a juror in defendant's trial (R. 151). 
Another panelist at the very end of the list, Gary 
Pickering, was excused for cause at defense counsel's request, 
without in-chambers voir dire (R. 152, 324). Pickering had been 
a burglary victim some years earlier (R. 307-08). Quite aside 
from this, Pickering asserted throughout voir dire that his 
beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness compelled him to resist jury duty 
(e.g., R. 270, 294). He stated: "[BJecause of conscience, I 
won't serve. I prefer a jail sentence" (R. 264). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has proven neither "plain error" nor "counsel 
ineffectiveness," such that the jury selection issues that he 
raises for the first time on appeal should warrant reversal of 
his conviction. No Utah appellate opinion has held that a trial 
court's decision to conduct less-searching voir dire than 
defendant now demands would amount, on appeal, to obvious error. 
Here the trial court focused its voir dire upon those jurors who 
appeared most likely to carry unacceptable biases, and respected 
the privacy of others. This was a proper exercise of the trial 
court's discretion. Even if the trial court might have abused 
its discretion, defendant has not shown that he was harmed as a 
result, and his "plain error" argument also fails on this basis. 
Defense counsel's choice to not more aggressively 
interrogate and challenge prospective jurors for cause was 
10 
permissible under the wide latitude that must be afforded to 
trial counsel. Active in the jury selection process, counsel 
appropriately removed those jurors whose impartiality was most 
questionable. In his professional judgment, counsel was allowed 
to do this either by for-cause or peremptory challenges. 
Therefore, "counsel ineffectiveness," like plain error, does not 
afford defendant a new trial, based upon jury selection arguments 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
Defendant's argument that he cannot be convicted of 
both robbery and burglary can be summarily rejected. Properly 
framed, his argument is that one of these offenses is a lesser 
offense included within the other; a quick review of the elements 
of each offense demonstrates that this is not so. Each offense 
contains an element that is absent in the other. Therefore, it 
is entirely appropriate to hold defendant liable for both robbery 
and burglary, for these were separate offenses committed during 
the same criminal episode. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS WAS FREE FROM 
REVERSIBLE "PLAIN ERROR," AND TRIAL COUNSEL 
PERFORMED EFFECTIVELY IN JURY SELECTION. 
Defendant first argues that the trial jury was 
improperly selected, in violation of his constitutional right to 
an impartial jury. In particular, he argues that panelists Frank 
Barber, Larry Pike, and Daniel Heap, who all sat on the jury, 
should have been questioned more probingly during voir dire, or 
11 
else challenged for cause. Panelist Phyllis Geurts, he argues, 
should also have been challenged for cause, rather than removed 
with a defense peremptory challenge. 
Defendant did not object to the now-asserted 
improprieties at trial, and jury selection errors are normally 
waived on appeal absent a timely trial court objection. See Utah 
R. Crim. P. 18(c); State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988) 
(jury selection issue waived under Rule 18(c)); State v. Miller. 
674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 1983) (same, under Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d) 
timely objection rule).6 On appeal, represented by new counsel, 
defendant seeks relief from his jury selection waiver under 
either the "plain error" or "ineffective counsel" doctrines. 
These arguments will be considered in turn. 
A. Absence of "Plain Error." 
The "plain error" exception to the waiver rule has been 
fully explained in State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989), State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), and State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah 
6Rule 18(c)(l)(ii) states in part, "The challenge to the 
[jury] panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn . . . " 
(emphasis added). Rule 18(c)(2) states in part: "A challenge to 
an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn to 
try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it 
to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the 
evidence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules 
relating to challenges to a panel and the hearings thereon shall 
apply" (emphasis added). 
Defendant argues that under Rules 18 and 20, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, "defense attorneys are not required to object 
to the omissions of the trial courts" (Br. of Appellant at 16). 
This astonishing proposition finds no support in the cited rules, 
flies in the face of "black letter" legal principle, and will not 
be further addressed in this brief. 
12 
App. 1991). The plain error exception contains two elements: 
First, the error must be "obvious," compelling a conclusion that 
the trial court should have known that it was committing error. 
Second, the error must be "harmful" or "prejudicial;" that is, 
there must be a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the 
trial outcome would have been more favorable to the appellant. 
Eldredae, 773 P.2d at 35.7 Defendant has not demonstrated the 
existence of either element here. 
1* No "Obvious" Error. 
Juror Frank Barber 
Under plain error analysis, defendant's argument that 
"[j]uror Barber was incompetent" (Br. of appellant at 7) must be 
restated as "juror Barber was obviously incompetent," and 
therefore should not have been seated on the jury. Defendant's 
argument fails, for he misunderstands the term "incompetent." 
"Competence" and "incompetence" to serve as a juror are 
defined in Utah Code Ann. S§ 78-46-7 and 78-46-8 (1992), within 
Utah's Jury Selection and Service Act (reproduced in Appendix I 
of this brief).8 Under section 78-46-7, competence for jury 
7In Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922, this Court identified 
"plain error" and "exceptional circumstances" as distinct 
doctrines that may afford relief from the waiver (or "procedural 
default") rule. The State prefers to view both plain error and 
"counsel ineffectiveness" as subcategories under "exceptional 
circumstances." Both doctrines, after all, are "exceptions" to 
the general waiver rule. 
8The Jury Selection and Service Act was amended, effective 
after defendant's March 1992 trial. The amendments relating to 
the arguments raised in this appeal appear to be largely in 
arrangement of the various provisions rather than in substantive 
content. See Utah Code Ann. S 78-46-7, -8, -10, -12, -15 (Supp. 
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service consists of citizenship, age, residency, and English 
language requirements. Section 78-46-8 declares that convicted 
felons, active duty military personnel, and persons with mental 
and physical disabilities are not competent to serve. Juror 
competence, therefore, addresses basic, minimal qualifications 
for jury service. 
Competence does not, as defendant seems to argue, deal 
with juror "bias." Bias is covered by distinctive provisions of 
Rule 18(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. As summarized in 
Rule 18(e)(14), bias refers to "a state of mind [that] exists on 
the part of the juror with reference to the cause, or to either 
party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without 
prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging . . 
." (emphasis added). Bias, then, is a mental state favoring one 
party over the other. A challenge for cause will lie against a 
juror who is either incompetent or is biased (or both), see Rule 
18(e) (1), (2), (14). However, incompetence and bias are not 
overlapping characteristics. 
Juror Barber was not obviously incompetent, such that 
the trial court erred in failing, on its own motion, to remove 
him for cause. Barber only stated that he had a schedule 
conflict, posed by his wife's physical therapy appointments, that 
might cause him to be less than fully attentive at trial (R. 
270). This clearly does not amount to a "mental disability," a 
1992). For clarity, the provisions actually in force at the time 
of defendant's trial are used in this brief. 
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form of incompetence under the Jury Selection and Service Act. 
Well-educated, and employed as an engineer (R. 281), Barber was 
not "disabled" by his schedule conflict.9 
Further, by its terms, the Jury Selection and Service 
Act contemplates that "mental disability" is generally raised by 
the prospective juror, not by a party. Even then, the trial 
court is not bound to remove the juror; instead, the court may 
require "a physician's certificate verifying the disability." 
See section 78-46-8(c). Accordingly, the trial court in this 
case was in no way required to view Juror Barber as "incompetent" 
under the controlling law, and to remove him for cause based upon 
the possible distracting influence of his schedule conflict. 
Even though Barber professed an inability to devote 
full attention to defendant's trial, given his need to care for 
his wife, the trial court could not possibly predict which party 
would be prejudiced by that distraction. Absent any for-cause 
challenge, the trial court could quite reasonably presume that 
the risk of prejudice—that is, the risk that Barber would be 
biased—was equally borne between the parties. Therefore, the 
court properly chose not to interfere with both parties' 
decisions, implicit in their lack of any challenge to him, that 
Barber was a desirable juror. 
9Most of the cases cited by defendant in support of his 
"incompetence" argument, as he describes them (Br. of Appellant 
at 11-12), uphold trial court discretion to remove certain 
jurors. The cases that seemingly command removal involve more 
serious disabilities such as physical or mental impairment, poor 
hearing, inability to understand English, and sleeping—factors 
not present in this case. 
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If there was any legitimate reason to remove Barber 
from jury service, that reason lay in section 78-46-15 of the 
Jury Selection and Service Act. That provision allows trial 
courts, at their discretion, to excuse prospective jurors on 
grounds of "undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, or public 
necessity . . . ." However, Rule 18(h), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, states that "[a] statutory exemption from service as a 
juror is a privilege of the person exempted and is not a ground 
for challenge for cause" (emphasis added). Therefore, defendant 
cannot complain of the failure to grant Barber a "hardship" 
exemption; under Rule 18(h), he has no standing to do so. 
Finally, it now appears, based upon the post-trial 
affidavit of Mr. Barber, that he did in fact resolve the conflict 
posed by his responsibility toward his wife, as requested by the 
trial court. This fact need not be supplemented into the record 
if this Court agrees with the legal analysis already presented. 
However, if this Court rejects that analysis, the State asks it 
to consider Barber's affidavit, in support of the argument that 
it was not "obvious error" to seat him on this jury. 
On no legitimate basis, then, has defendant shown 
"obvious" error in the trial court's decision to seat Barber on 
the trial jury. Barber was neither incompetent, biased, nor 
otherwise obviously subject to dismissal from jury service. 
Jurors Larry Pike and Daniel Heap 
Defendant argues that because jurors Pike and Heap had 
both been burglary victims (R. 309-10), an "inference of bias" 
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attached to each. His argument relies upon State v. Woollev, 810 
P.2d 440 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). In 
Woollev, a panel majority held that an "inference of bias" arises 
when a prospective juror has been a victim of a crime similar to 
the one being tried. 810 P.2d at 443 (quoting State v. Cobb, 774 
P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989)). The majority then held that under 
such circumstances, "the trial judge must probe the juror to 
insure that he or she can decide the case impartially despite the 
past victimization . . .." .Id., at 444 (emphasis added). 
Based upon the foregoing language, defendant's argument 
is that the trial court committed "obvious" error when it failed 
to thoroughly "probe" jurors Pike and Heap about their past 
experience as burglary victims, even though no such "probing" was 
requested by counsel. While Woollev can be read to support 
defendant's argument, there are several reasons why this Court 
should not do so. 
First, Woollev was a case where the crime-victim jury 
panelists were challenged by trial counsel. 810 P.2d at 441-42. 
Woollev thus arose in the traditional manner: the jury selection 
issue had been properly preserved for appeal. Thus despite the 
strong criticism that it levelled at the trial court, the Woollev 
majority did not hold that the failure to more fully "probe" the 
victim-panelists would have been "obvious" error, even absent a 
timely challenge.10 In fact, in a post-Woollev decision, State 
10ln State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991), also relied 
upon by defendant, the supreme court, exercising its "supervisory 
role over the lower courts," "remind[ed] trial judges to take 
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v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 177 (Utah App. 1992), this Court 
implicitly rejected an "obvious error" argument where the 
defendant raised jury selection issues for the first time on 
appeal, as does this defendant. 
Next, the Woollev majority discerned "no good policy 
reason not to require probing to clarify any possible prejudice 
when fundamental rights are at stake." 810 P.2d at 444. One 
such reason, however, was acknowledged after Woollev, and before 
this defendant's trial. In State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554 (Utah 
App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992), this Court 
affirmed "the trial court's duty to protect juror privacy." 818 
P.2d at 559 (internal quotations omitted, quoting State v. Ball, 
685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984)). It was therefore within the 
trial court's sound discretion here to respect the privacy of 
jurors Pike and Heap, and not "probe" them about their past 
burglaries.n 
care to adequately and completely probe jurors on all possible 
issues of bias, including press coverage." .Id. at 797-98. 
Unfortunately, by not "commenting upon the effectiveness or the 
wisdom of the process of voir dire" that had been conducted in 
James, id. at 797, or even describing the process, the supreme 
court gave no guidance about what constitutes "adequate" versus 
"inadequate" voir dire. James, then, is a poor source, if it is 
any source at all, for an "obvious error" ruling in this case. 
nThe Woollev majority recognized the varying formulations 
of the discretion afforded to trial courts in jury selection— 
including "sound discretion" and "some deference." 810 P.2d at 
442 n.2. In Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 174, this Court identified a 
"broad discretion" standard. The governing voir dire rule, Utah 
R. Crim. P. 18(b), remains couched in discretionary language 
(trial court "may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement 
the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper . . ." 
(emphasis added)). If courts now "must probe" certain 
prospective jurors more deeply, it seems that Rule 18(b) should 
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Additionally, Pike and Heap did not respond when the 
trial court asked the general question, immediately upon 
identification of the victim-panelists, whether "anything" might 
cause them to be biased (R. 310-11). Because Pike and Heap thus 
tacitly asserted that their past experiences would not prejudice 
them against defendant, no "obvious error" should be found in the 
trial court's determination that they could in fact "well and 
truly try the matter in issue," as they were sworn to do under 
Rule 18(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Further, the trial court did individually examine the 
prospective jurors who had been direct victims of violent crimes, 
i.e., assault and robbery. One of those victims, Alta Ludlow, 
was properly excused for cause upon her admission of likely 
resulting bias (R. 320). (The other, Debra Trump, did not 
require a for-cause challenge—if indeed such challenge might 
have been granted over her assertion of impartiality (R. 318-19), 
for she was too far down the jury list to be selected.) By 
focusing voir dire scrutiny upon those panelists who had been 
directly assaulted—and therefore more severely traumatized—as 
crime victims, the court showed that it knew how to, and indeed 
did, properly exercise its discretion in jury selection. There 
was no "obvious error" in its decision to not "probe" the victim-
panelists who had been burglarized, but not directly assaulted. 
be amended, via the Utah Supreme Court's rulemaking process, see 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 11-101, to reflect that requirement. 
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Finally, the notion that prospective jurors are 
"inferentially biased," because of past victimization in similar 
crimes, ought to be seriously questioned. That judicially-
created inference contradicts an express policy statement in 
Utah's Jury Selection and Service Act: 
It is the policy of this state that persons 
selected for jury or grand jury service be 
selected at random from a fair cross section of 
the population of the area served by the court, 
and that all qualified citizens have the 
opportunity in accordance with this chapter to be 
considered for service and have the obligation to 
serve when summoned for that purpose. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-2 (1992). 
Courts should not circumvent the expressed legislative 
intention that "all qualified citizens" have the right and the 
duty to serve on criminal juries, by imposing an unproven 
"inference of bias" upon those who have themselves been crime 
victims.12 In light of section 78-46-2, that practice violates 
Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution (Appendix I of this 
brief), an express "distribution of powers" declaration. It also 
re-victimizes law-abiding citizens who have been crime victims, 
by eroding their jury service right. Accordingly, the practice 
12The State is aware of no empirical proof that past 
experience as a crime victim necessarily affects a citizen's 
ability to act as an impartial juror in a similar but unrelated 
case. Compare Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 230-45, 98 S. Ct. 
1029, 1034-41 (1978) (holding that jury must have at least six 
members, to assure a constitutionally-required impartial jury in 
nonpetty criminal trials, after reviewing scientific studies of 
group decisionmaking process). Cf. Davis v. State, 93 Md. App. 
89, 611 A.2d 1008, 1010 (criticising "tall tales" by "storied 
masters of trial advocacy," championing expansive juror voir 
dire), cert, granted, Md. , 616 A.2d 1286 (1992). 
20 
should not be sanctioned, especially not by finding "obvious 
error" in decisions not to intrusively "probe" such citizens, or 
exclude them from jury service. 
Panelist Phyllis Geurts 
Defense counsel used a peremptory challenge to exclude 
panelist Geurts from the jury (R. 151). Utah's appellate courts 
have held that "[i]t is prejudicial error to compel a party to 
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror who 
should have been removed for cause." Woollev, 810 P.2d at 440 
(citing authority). Here, however, defendant was not "compelled" 
to remove Geurts with a peremptory challenge, for he raised no 
for-cause challenge against her. 
Further, one potential problem with panelist Geurts was 
the fact that her husband had once been a defense witness, 
adverse to the same prosecutor who represented the State in this 
trial (R. 314-15). Thus while her experience as a burglary 
victim yields an unproven "inference" that Geurts might have been 
predisposed against defendant, her husband's past adverse role 
against the prosecutor might equally have predisposed Geurts 
against the State. With these facts known, plus Geurts's shared 
religious affiliation with the prosecutor, the trial court did 
not commit "obvious" error when it did not take matters into its 
own hands, and excuse Geurts for cause. 
2. No Likelihood of a More Favorable Result. 
If this Court agrees that no "obvious" error occurred 
in the jury selection process, it need proceed no further. 
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Instead, it can hold that defendant is not entitled to relief 
from the trial-level waiver of his jury selection arguments, for 
he has not proven the "obviousness" element of "plain error." In 
Eldredqe, 773 P.2d at 36, the Utah Supreme Court did just this, 
in disposing of an evidentiary argument first raised on appeal. 
Even if some "obvious" error in jury selection were 
found by this Court, defendant makes no effort to demonstrate a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable trial verdict, absent 
such error. Because it is clearly his burden to make such a 
showing of prejudice, see Verde, 770 P.2d at 122, his "plain 
error" argument also fails on this basis. 
Apparently defendant wants this Court to declare that 
the trial jury, composed of eight law-abiding citizens, who all 
asserted an ability to try his case fairly, was nevertheless 
biased, in violation of his constitutional right to an impartial 
jury. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Utah Const. Art. I, § 12. All of 
those jurors, however, were passed for cause by trial counsel and 
the trial court, who observed the jurors first-hand. Neither 
this Court nor defendant's appellate counsel enjoys that 
"advantaged view." See State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 177 
(Utah App. 1992) (declining to find plain error in jury 
selection, where the trial court and the parties had advantaged 
view of actual jurors). Accordingly, this Court ought not set 
aside the trial-level judgment, shared by court and counsel, that 
an impartial jury had been seated. 
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Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that 
an impartial jury is achieved through the collective mix of a 
group of jurors. Each individual juror, it is understood, will 
hold certain biases: 
[T]he smaller the group, the less likely it is to 
overcome the biases of its members to obtain an 
accurate result. When individual and group 
decisionmaking were compared, it was seen that 
groups performed better because prejudices of 
individuals were frequently counterbalanced, and 
objectivity resulted Because juries 
frequently face complex problems laden with value 
choices, the benefits are important and should be 
retained. In particular, the counterbalancing of 
various biases is critical to the accurate 
application of the common sense of the community 
to the facts of any given case. 
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233-34, 98 S. Ct. 1029, 1035-36 
(1978) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). In other words, an 
impartial jury is not achieved by "ferreting out" all possible 
bias from every individual juror.13 Instead, it is achieved by 
recognizing that each individual juror holds some biases, and 
that unless extreme, such biases will be counterbalanced by other 
jurors' biases. 
13Ballew (1978), in the State's view, supersedes the 
language in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S. Ct. 546 
(1965), quoted in Br. of Appellant at 14, suggesting that every 
individual juror must be free of all bias. Turner also involved 
improper jury-witness contact, a factor absent here. 
The "ferreting" metaphor is interesting, derived from 
ferret, a "form of the Old World polecat, often trained to hunt 
rats or rabbits," or a "weasellike mammal." Webster's II New 
Riverside University Dictionary 472 (Houghton Mifflin 1988). It 
calls to mind a jury of rats and rabbits, set upon by polecats 
and weasels, and fosters the cynical view that lay citizens and 
attorneys commonly hold toward each other. 
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Utah felony juries already exceed the federal 
impartiality standard, based upon the number of required jurors: 
Ballew sets a minimum of six jurors for nonpetty criminal juries. 
435 U.S. at 243-45, 98 S. Ct. at 1041. However, Article I, 
section 10 of the Utah Constitution explicitly mandates that 
noncapital felonies be tried to an eight-member jury. Obviously, 
this enhances the bias-counterbalancing effect of the group 
decision process in Utah courts. 
In apparently arguing that this trial jury was not 
impartial, defendant therefore erroneously focuses upon only 
three of the eight jurors: Barber, Pike, and Heap. Even if 
those three jurors might have had some slight bias against 
defendant—stemming from schedule conflicts, past crime 
victimization, or whatever, this says absolutely nothing about 
the other five jurors. In light of Ballew and the higher Utah 
standard for minimum jury size, it is entirely appropriate to 
assume that at least some of those five jurors held defense-
favorable biases, counterbalancing any possible defense-adverse 
biases held by their three colleagues. 
Defendant also attempts to prove jury bias by arguing 
that one of his peremptory challenges was wasted on panelist 
Geurts, who he claims should have been excused for cause. This 
attempt is grounded in the following pronouncement of the Utah 
Supreme Court: 
It is no excuse to say that the verdict was 
unanimous and since six of the eight jurors could 
find a verdict, the error [in failing to remove a 
juror for cause] was harmless. By exercising one 
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of their peremptory challenges upon this 
prospective juror, plaintiffs had only two 
remaining. The juror which remained because the 
plaintiffs had no challenge to remove him may have 
been a hawk amid seven doves and imposed his will 
upon them. 
Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975). This long-
established rule of automatic prejudice, see Woollev, 810 P.2d at 
440, was supported by no cited authority in the Crawford opinion. 
Worse, in establishing the automatic prejudice rule, 
the Utah Supreme Court overlooked or ignored its own longstanding 
precedents "This contention that prejudice is presumed from an 
erroneous ruling in a challenge for cause when all peremptory 
challenges have been exhausted was raised by appellants in the 
case of State v. Thorne, 41 Utah 414, 426, 126 P. 286, 291 
[(1912)], and was overruled." Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R. Co., 
112 Utah 189, 196-99, 186 P.2d 293, 297 (1947) (emphasis added). 
Accord State v. Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 530 (1973); 
State v. Cano, 64 Utah 87, 228 P.2d 563 (1924). The Van Wagoner 
and Thorne opinions were supported by extensive analysis and 
citation to authorities, and supported the principle that a 
convicted defendant who complains of a biased jury must support 
that complaint with proof. See Thorne, 41 Utah at 426-27, 126 P. 
at 291-92. Accord Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86, 108 S. Ct. 
2273, 2277 (1988). 
Seen in this light, the Crawford v. Manning automatic 
prejudice rule appears very unsound. The State hopes to persuade 
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the supreme court to overrule it.1A In any event, the rule's 
application should be strictly limited to those cases where a 
for-cause juror challenge is made in the trial court, preserving 
the issue for appellate review. "More than mere speculation is 
required to support a charge of lack of jury impartiality on 
appeal." State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Utah 1991). As 
fanciful speculation, at best, of prejudicial jury selection 
error, the Crawford rule should never be applied in a case like 
this one, where no trial-level, for-cause juror challenge has 
preserved the issue for appellate review.13 
In sum, defendant has proven neither obvious error nor 
resulting prejudice to him, in the trial court's handling of the 
jury selection process. Accordingly, he has not established 
14The Crawford rule recently led to reversal of a capital 
homicide conviction in State v. Young, No. 890424, slip op. at 
17-18, 99-101 (Utah March 17, 1993). There three justices found 
"clear error" in the trial court's refusal to remove one juror 
for cause, see id. at 99, where a peremptory challenge had been 
used to remove the juror. More stringent scrutiny of jury 
selection may be justified in capital cases. Even so, one of the 
Young majority justices commented that "in voting to reverse 
defendant's conviction, no member of this court has suggested 
that he is innocent of the appalling crime of which he was 
convicted or that the commission of that crime by one with 
defendant's past record of violent crime cannot be punished by 
death." Jji. at 134 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting). 
15The Crawford "hawk amid seven doves" metaphor is also 
curious. It implies that litigants are somehow entitled to a 
jury composed solely of "doves" who, like their pigeon cousins, 
might be trained or conditioned to perform certain simple tricks. 
"Hawks," meanwhile—alert, independent, and perceptive, are to be 
avoided. This seems cynical and inappropriate, particularly in a 
democratic society composed of both "doves" and "hawks:" both 
groups should be represented on juries. 
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"plain error" in that process, and is not entitled to a reversal 
of his conviction. 
B. Effective Assistance of Counsel. 
Defendant alternatively argues that his trial-level 
waiver of jury selection issues should be overcome by the 
doctrine of "ineffective assistance of counsel," as set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
By waiving deeper voir dire "probing," and not raising more for-
cause juror challenges, defendant argues, his trial counsel 
performed in a prejudicially deficient fashion. 
This Court has recognized that "plain error" and 
"counsel ineffectiveness" arguments, raised for the first time on 
appeal, share "a common standard." State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
124 n.15 (Utah 1989)). Like plain error, counsel ineffectiveness 
entails a two-element, "error plus resulting harm" test. 
The "error" element of counsel ineffectiveness is 
framed as "deficient performance." To prove this element, the 
defendant must overcome a "strong presumption" of competent 
performance, and prove that trial counsel seriously blundered, in 
a manner that falls outside "the wide latitude counsel must have 
in making tactical decisions." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. 
The "resulting harm" or "prejudice" element is the same as for 
plain error: the defendant must show that but for counsel 
blunder(s), there is a reasonable likelihood that the verdict 
would have been more favorable. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 174. As 
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with plain error, the defendant must normally prove both 
elements. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 696, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 
2069; Verde, 770 P.2d at 118-19 & n.2. 
Because the plain error and counsel ineffectiveness 
tests so closely resemble one another, the State's plain error 
analysis also applies to counsel ineffectiveness. Accordingly, 
the State incorporates that analysis, without repetition, into 
its argument that trial counsel performed effectively on 
defendant's behalf. As follows, the State adds some additional 
observations in support of this argument, and in defense of trial 
counsel's performance. 
1. No Deficient Counsel Performance. 
Trial counsel did not blunder his way through jury 
selection. Instead, the record reflects that he was fully 
involved in voir dire, and reasonably exercised his juror 
challenge rights. 
Counsel himself questioned the panelists, stressing 
their duty to acquit defendant if the "beyond a reasonable" doubt 
standard were not met (R. 312). Similarly, during in-chambers 
voir dire, counsel followed up on panelist Geurts's indirect 
contacts with the prosecutor (R. 315), panelist Trump's 
experiences as a robbery victim and a lineup witness (R. 317-19), 
and panelist Ludlow's experience as a victim of both violent 
crime and burglary (R. 320-21). After voir dire, counsel's 
consensus agreement with the court and prosecutor, to remove 
panelist Ludlow for cause, was appropriately based upon Ludlow's 
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admission that her impartiality was doubtful (R. 321, 324). See 
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 173 (counsel and court cooperatively 
decided juror challenges; ineffectiveness claim rejected). 
Counsel was not required to aggressively "probe" every 
juror who had any sort of experience as a crime victim, as his 
present counsel advocates. See Jones, 823 P.2d at 1063 ("This 
Court will not review counsel's tactical decisions simply because 
another lawyer, e.g., appellate counsel, would have taken a 
different course"). Nor was he required to challenge those 
jurors, either for cause or peremptorily, because counsel need 
not raise every available objection in order to perform 
competently. See, e.g., State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1066-68 
(Utah 1988) (no deficient performance where "it was conceivable" 
that objections were foregone as part of strategy). Counsel also 
had professional latitude to remove certain panelists with 
peremptory challenges, rather than through for-cause challenges. 
See Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 176-77 (counsel permissibly waived one 
peremptory challenge, and used others to remove three panelists 
assailed "for cause" on appeal). 
In fact, aggressive "probing" of prospective jurors 
might itself cause the very harm it purports to prevent, by 
annoying the panelists and prejudicing them against the "probing" 
counsel's case. The prosecutor engaged in only minimal "probing" 
here. Trial defense counsel also limited his voir dire, except 
in those instances when bias seemed most likely, and thereby 
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limited the likelihood of actually causing harmful jury bias. 
This was competent performance. 
As a policy matter, this Court should hold a very hard 
line against overcoming trial-level waiver of legal issues via 
"ineffective counsel" appellate arguments. Regarding jury 
selection, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has refused to 
find deficient performance in trial counsel's decision to seat a 
juror who affirmatively declared a bias in favor of the 
prosecution. See Delrio v. State, 840 S.W.2d 443, 444-45 (Texas 
Crim. App. 1992) (en banc) (juror was an ex-narcotics officer who 
knew the narcotics-offense defendant, and stated, "I couldn't be 
impartial, I'm saying"). The Texas court determined that some 
conceivable tactic might have underpinned this unusual decision; 
it also held that jury selection is subject to the same waiver 
principles as other legal issues. 840 S.W.2d at 445-46. The 
Texas court's holding also supports the principle that trial 
counsel ought not be permitted to plant the seeds of a later 
reversal, by appearing to perform "deficiently." 
This Court alluded to such a policy concern in 
Ellifritz, 815 P.2d at 177. Citing State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 
155, 158-59 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S. Ct. 
3720 (1990), with respect to plain error, the Court observed that 
the practice of "invited error" would be supported unless 
stringent standards for appellate consideration of such claims 
were maintained. A similar policy concern is evident in 
Strickland, where the United States Supreme Court, expressing the 
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"profound importance of finality in criminal proceedings," 
reiterated that a showing of counsel ineffectiveness must be 
powerfully made. 466 U.S. at 693-94, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. 
No such powerful showing has been made here. This 
Court may not like the jury selection approach that trial counsel 
took in this case. Nevertheless, this Court should recognize 
that counsel's approach was permissible, under the wide latitude 
that must be afforded to him. 
2. No Resulting Harm. 
Apparently conceding that he cannot affirmatively prove 
that trial counsel's alleged jury selection blunders harmed him, 
defendant asks this Court to relieve him of his normal burden 
under Strickland, and to presume prejudice (Br. of Appellant at 
21). This would be a mistake. 
Strickland sets forth but two instances in which 
counsel blunder must give rise to a presumption of prejudice. 
Prejudice is presumed when counsel assistance is effectively 
denied altogether, or when the state itself interferes with 
counsel's ability to function. 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 
2067. There is a "more limited" presumption of prejudice when 
counsel has a conflict of interest with the defendant. Id. 
(quotations and citations omitted). None of these things 
happened here: trial counsel was unimpeded by the State, and 
acted solely on defendant's behalf. 
In urging this Court to expand the exceptions to the 
normal rule that defendants must affirmatively prove that 
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counsel's blunder caused harm, defendant relies upon Presley v. 
State, 750 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. App.), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 975, 109 
S. Ct. 514 (1988). Presley involved counsel's failure to 
challenge, either for cause or peremptorily, a juror who clearly 
stated that he would be "partial to the state." 750 S.W.2d at 
604, 607. No such admittedly biased persons sat on the jury that 
tried this defendant. Thus Presley, not controlling in any 
event, would not support a presumption of prejudice here, even if 
it were held that counsel unreasonably failed to further probe or 
challenge certain jurors. 
People v. Wagner, 104 A.D.2d 457, 479 N.Y.S.2d 66 (App. 
Div. 2 Dept. 1984), also relied on by defendant, is a case where 
nine of twelve jurors had close police contacts, the trial turned 
on officer testimony, and counsel failed to investigate those 
contacts. 104 A.D.2d at 68. This error, resulting in a jury 
said to resemble "a miniature police force," id., was but one of 
many "derelictions" of trial counsel. JEd. at 69. Similarly, 
Mason v. State, 289 Ark. 299, 712 S.W.2d 275 (1986), involved 
multiple counsel blunders not limited to jury selection. Neither 
opinion suggests, however, that the reviewing court applied any 
presumption of resulting harm. Wagner and Mason, then, do not 
help defendant. 
Application of a presumption of prejudice to counsel 
miscues in jury selection would also be poor policy. There may 
be any number of other cases in which, upon review of cold 
transcripts, belated attacks on counsel's jury selection 
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performance might be made. By presuming harm in such cases, the 
waiver rule—which clearly applies to jury selection, see Utah R. 
Crim. P. 18(c)(2), would effectively be swallowed by its "counsel 
ineffectiveness" exception. Instead, the finality of trial court 
judgments should be supported, by upholding the waiver rule 
against jury selection challenges that are raised for the first 
time on appeal.16 
The burden to show actual harm from counsel blunders in 
jury selection, then, properly rests with defendant, as does the 
burden of proving that actual blunders were made. Having failed 
to carry either burden, defendant's allegation of trial counsel 
ineffectiveness should be rejected. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF BOTH 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND AGGRAVATED BURGLARY. 
Defendant makes another argument, also unpreserved by 
trial-level objection, that he could not be convicted of both 
16Sounder Utah cases finding reversible error in preserved 
jury selection issues have been those in which the challenged 
jurors acknowledged actual bias. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 734 
P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987) (two jurors admitted that they would be 
affected by close ties to murder victim's family); State v. 
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26 (Utah 1984) (juror expressed bias for 
prosecution and stated, "In essence, I would prefer not to be 
here"); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981) (two 
jurors "expressed strong feelings of anger and frustration" as 
victims of crimes similar to that being tried); Jenkins v. 
Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 535-36 (Utah 1981) (juror admitted 
tendency to believe defendant physician in malpractice suit); 
State v. Bailev, 605 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah 1980) (two jurors agreed 
that police testimony could be relied upon "to the utmost"); 
Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Utah 1975) (juror in 
wrongful death action expressed "strong feelings" about trying to 
recover money for the death of another). Again here, no such 
admittedly-biased jurors were allowed to sit. 
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aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. This argument, 
essentially that the burglary was a lesser included offense 
within the robbery, should be summarily rejected. 
This Court need consider neither plain error nor 
counsel ineffectiveness as bases for overcoming defendant's 
trial-level waiver of this argument. Had defendant objected to 
either the dual charges or the dual convictions in the trial 
court, the objection would have been correctly denied. Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (1990), robbery includes the element 
of "taking of personal property" through force or fear. The act 
of "taking" is not part of the offense of burglary.17 
Burglary, however, defined under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
202 (1990), does include an element that is not part of the 
robbery definitions the act of "enter[ing] or remain[ing] in a 
building" with criminal intent. The Utah Supreme Court has 
squarely rejected defendant's argument that "remaining" is not an 
"act" for the purposes of the burglary statute. See State v. 
Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985, amended on rehearing 
1988). Accordingly, once defendant wore out his welcome in the 
Vert home by threatening and handcuffing Stephanie Vert within 
the home, he committed burglary. See id. Then, when he took 
17The "aggravating" element for aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary is quite similar, that is, the possession or 
use of a "dangerous weapon" in the course of the offense. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-203, 76-6-302 (1990). Therefore, the State 
analyzes only the simple robbery and simple burglary statutes for 
the purpose of this argument. 
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property from the home, an act accomplished with the aid of that 
threat and assault, defendant committed robbery. 
In short, the offenses of aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary, while overlapping, each contain an element 
not found within the other. This makes them separate criminal 
offenses, for which defendant was properly tried and convicted, 
even though they were committed during a "single criminal 
episode," under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1990). See State v. 
Eichler, 584 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah 1978) (robbery and kidnapping 
during same episode: both convictions affirmed); State v. Jones, 
13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 262 (1962) (burglary and theft (then 
larceny) during same episode: both convictions affirmed); Duran 
v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038 (Utah App. 1990) (same). Defendant's 
argument to the contrary, which ignores controlling legal 
precedent, is therefore meritless. 
CONCLUSION 
Our adversary system of justice did not fail this 
defendant. He received a fair trial, and the convictions 
resulting from that trial should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^*=> day of March, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHYv » 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX I 
Utah Jury Selection and Service Act 
(copied from unannotated Utah Code, 1991), 
and 
Utah Constitution, Article V, section 1 
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request of the court of die ether state a certified copy 
of the transcript of any court record and other docu-
ments mentioned in Section 7845c-21. mo 
7845c-23. Foreign countries — Application irf 
general policies. 
The general policies of this act extend to the inter-
national area. The provisions of this act relating to 
the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees of 
ether states apply to custody decrees and decrees in-
volving legal institutions similar in nature to custody 
rendered by appropriate authorities of other nations 
if reasonable notioe and opportunity to be heard were 
given to all affected persons. iseo 
7845c-24. Priority on eoort calendar. 
Upon the request of a party to a custody proceeding 
which raises a question of existence or exercise of 
jurisdiction under this act the ease shall be given cal-
endar priority and handled expeditiously tun 
7&45c-2&. Notices — Orders to appear — Man-
ser of service-
CD Whenever the terms of this act impose a duty 
upon the court to notify a party or court of a particu-
lar fact or action, such notification may be accom-
plished by the clerk of the court or a party to the 
action upon order of the court 
(2) Orders of the court for parties or persons to ap-
pear before the court in accordance with the terms of 
this act anatf include Jegaf and sufficient service of 
process in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure unless otherwise ordered for good cause 
shown. iseo 
7&-45c-». Short title. 
This act may be cited as the "Utah Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act" iseo 
CHAPTER 46d 
CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION 
(Repealed by Laws 1988, eh. 1, I 407.) 
7&45d-l to 78454-13. Repealed. 
PART V 
JURORS 
CHAPTER 46 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 
7846-11. Master jury wheel — Selection of names 
to put in jury wheel — Certification of 
Section 
78-46-1. 
78-46-2 
78-46-3. 
78-46-4. 
7846-5. 
7846-6. 
7846-7. 
7846-8. 
7846-9. 
7846-10. 
Short title. 
Jurors and grand jurors selected from 
random cross section — Opportunity 
and obligation to serve. 
Discrimination prohibited. 
Definitions. 
Number of trial jurors. 
Alternate trial jurors — Selection—Du-
ties and function. 
Parsons competent to serve as jurors. 
Determination on juror qualification — 
Persons not competent to aerve as ju-
7846-13. 
18 4f» j I 
7846-15. 
7846-16. 
7846-17. 
7846-18. 
7846-19. 
7846-20 
7846-21. 
7846-22 
7846-23. 
Drawing prospective juror names from 
master wheel — Juror qualification 
form — Content — Completion — 
Penalties for failure to complete or 
misrepresentation — Joint jury wheel 
for court authorised. 
Drawing juror panels — Notice to jurors 
— Procedure when shortage of jurors 
drawn — Public inspection of names 
drawn and content of qualification 
forms — Exception. 
Qualified prospective jurors not exempt 
from jury service. 
Excuse from jury service. 
Jury not selected in conformity with 
chapter — Procedure to challenge — 
Relief available — Exclusive remedy. 
Preservation of records and papers by 
county clerk. 
Compensation and travel expenses of ju-
rors. 
limitations on jury service 
Penalties for failure to appear or com-
plete jury service. 
Employer not to discharge or threaten 
employee for jury eervice — Criminal 
penalty — Civil action by employee. 
Repealed. 
Court administrator's duties and respon-
aibilities. 
Repealed. 
Master list maintained by county clerk 
— Public examination —- Lists used in 
compiling master Mat available to 
county clerk. 
7846-1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may I 1 u\ In 
"Jury Selection and Service Act." i w% 
7846-2. Jurors and grand jurors selected from 
random cross section — Opportunity 
and obligation to aerve. 
It is the policy erf this state that persons selected for 
jury or grand jury service be selected at random from 
a fair cross section of the population of the area 
eerved by the court, and that all qualified citizens 
havts the opportunity in accordance with this chapter 
to b* considered for service and have the obligation to 
aerve when summoned for that purpose. isso 
7846-8. Discrimination prohibited. 
A dtisen shall not be excluded or exempt from jury 
service on account of race, color, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, or economic status. itrs 
78464. Definition*. 
(1) "Clerk" or "clerk of the court" means the person 
ao designated by title and includes any deputy clerk. 
(2) "Court* means trial courts, and includes, when 
the context requires, any judge or justice of the court. 
(8) ''Grand jury" means a body of seven persons 
selected from the citizens of a particular county be-
a m a court of competent jurisdiction and sworn to 
inquire into public offenses committed or triable 
within the county. 
(4) "Jury" means a body of persons temporarily se-
lected from the citizens of a particular county in-
vested with power to present and indict a person for a 
public offense, or to try a question of fact. 
(6) "Jury wheel" means any physical device or elec-
tronic system for the storage of the names or identify-
ing numbers of prospective jurors. 
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(6) "Master jury wheel* means the jury wheel in 
which are placed names or identifying numbers of 
prospective jurors taken from the master list pursu-
ant to this ac t 
(7) "Master list* means the primary and secondary 
source lists as prescribed by the Judicial Council un-
der Section 78-46-10. 
(8) "Official register of voters" means the book 
maintained for each voting district containing the 
names of persons registered to vote within the voting 
district in the most recent general election. 
(9) "Qualified jury wheel* means the jury wheel in 
which are placed the names or identifying numbers of 
prospective jurors whose names are drawn at random 
from the master jury wheel and are determined to be 
qualified to serve as jurors. 
(10) "Trial jury* means a body of persons selected 
from the citizens of a particular county before a court 
or officer of competent jurisdiction, and sworn to try 
and determine by verdict a question of fact isss 
7 M 6 4 . Number of trial jurore-
(1) A trial jury in capital cases shall consist of 
twelve jurors. 
(2) A trial jury in district court in noncapital crimi-
nal or civil cases shall consist of eight jurors; provided 
that in misdemeanor and civil cases the jury may 
consist of any number less than eight upon which the 
parties may agree in open court 
(3) A trial jury in a circuit or justice court shall 
consist of six jurors in a class A misdemeanor trial, 
and in other criminal or civil cases the trial jury snail 
consist of four jurors or of any number less than four 
upon which the parties may agree in open court 
(4) A trial jury in a juvenile court shall consist of 
four jurors, ISTS 
78-4*4. Alternate trial jurors — Selection — 
Duties and function, 
(1) At the commencement of a felony trial when 
the court believes the trial may be long, the judge 
may cause an entry to that effect in the minutes, and 
immediately after the jury is impanelled and sworn, 
direct the calling of one additional juror to be known 
as "alternate juror.* 
(2) The alternate juror shall be drawn from the 
same source, in the same manner and have the same 
qualifications, be subject to the same examination 
and challenges as the jurors already sworn; provided, 
that each party is entitled to one peremptory chal-
lenge to the alternate juror. 
(3) The alternate juror shall be seated near, and 
have equal facilities for seeing and hearing the pro-
ceedings and shall take the same oath as the jurors 
already selected. The alternate juror must attend the 
trial at all times in company with the other jurors 
and shall obey the orders and be bound by the admo-
nition of the court at each adjournment If the regular 
jurors are ordered to be kept in the custody of the 
sheriff during the trial, the alternate shall be kept 
with the other jurors, and, except as herein provided, 
shall be discharged when the case is submitted to the 
jury. 
(4) If a juror dies or becomes ill and is unable to 
perform juror duties prior to the final submission of 
the case to the jury, the court may order the alternate 
juror to assume the juror's place in the jury box. The 
alternate juror is subject to the same rules and regu-
lations as the original jurors. lsrt 
78-46-7. Persons competent to serve as jurors. 
(1) A person is competent to serve as a juror if the 
person is: 
(a) a citisen of the United States; 
(b) over the age of 18 years; 
(c) a resident of the county; and 
(d) able to read, speak, and understand the En-
glish language. 
(2) In municipalities which are not primary or sec-
ondary locations for the circuit court, a person is not 
competent to serve as a juror in cases involving the 
violation of a municipal ordinance unless the person, 
in addition to meeting the requirements listed in 
Subsection (1), resides within the municipality whose 
ordinance is alleged to have been violated or, in the 
case of a municipality with a population of fewer than 
3,000 persons, resides within 15 miles of the munici-
pality. IMS 
78-46-8. Determination on juror qualification — 
Persons not competent to serve as ju-
rors. 
(1) The court, on its own initiative or when re-
quested by a prospective juror, shall determine 
whether the prospective juror is disqualified from 
jury service. The court shall base its decision on the 
information provided on the juror qualification form, 
or by interview with the prospective juror or other 
competent evidence. The clerk shall enter the court's 
determination on the juror qualification form and on 
the alphabetical list of names drawn from the master 
jury wheel. 
(2) The following persons are not competent to 
serve as jurors: 
(a) a person who has been convicted of a fel-
ony; 
(b) a person serving on active duty in the mili-
tary service of the United States; 
(c) a person who is not capable because of 
physical or mental disability of rendering satis-
factory jury service. Any person who claims this 
disqualification may be required to submit a phy-
sician's certificate verifying the disability and 
the certifying physician is subject to inquiry by 
the court at its discretion; or 
(d) a person who does not meet the require-
ments of Section 78-46-7. ISTI 
78-46-9. Repealed. isss 
78-46-10. Master list maintained by county 
clerk — Public examination — Lists 
used in compiling master list available 
to county clerk. 
(1) The county clerk for each county shall maintain 
the master list, which shall be open to the public for 
examination. 
(2) The person having custody, possession, or con-
trol of any list used in compiling the master list, in-
cluding any sources designated by the Judicial Coun-
cil as supplementary sources, shall make the list 
available to the county clerk at all reasonable times. 
ISSS 
78-46-11. Master jury wheel — Selection of 
names to put in jury whee l — Certifica-
tion of namee 
(1) A master jury wheel shall be maintained by 
each county in the office of the county clerk. The 
county clerk shall place the names or identifying 
numbers of prospective jurors taken from the master 
list into the jury wheel. The jury wheel shall be emp-
tied and refilled in December each year pursuant to 
this ac t 
(2) The number of names to be selected by the 
county clerk shall be determined by the judge or 
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judges of the district court for the county. Karnes 
shall be selected, as far as practical, from each of the 
voting districts within the county in proportion to the 
number of voters within each voting district Names 
shall be selected in a random but uniform pattern 
designed to select names from each entire list of 
names contained in the master list of the county. The 
name of any person selected may not be excluded by 
the county clerk except if the county dark knows the 
person to be deceased. 
(3) Tne name and address of each person selected 
shall be certified by the county clerk and immedi-
ately placed in the master jury wheel. tsss 
76-46-12. Drawing prospective Juror names 
from master wheel — Juror qualifica-
tion form — Content — Completion — 
Penalties for failure to complete or 
misrepresentation — Joint jury wheel 
for court authorised. 
(1) From time to time and as prescribed by the dis-
trict court, the county clerk shall draw as many 
names from the master jury wheel as the district, 
circuit, justice, or juvenile courts by order determine, 
shall alphabetize the list of names drawn, and shall 
furnish it to the court for which drawn. The names 
drawn may not be disclosed to any person other than 
pursuant to thi6 act or by specific order of the court. 
(2) The clerk of the court for which prospective ju-
ror names are furnished shall mail each prospective 
juror s juror qualification form and instructions to 
complete the form and return it by mail to the clerk 
within ten days after it is received. 
(3) (a) The juror qualification form i s subject to 
approval by the district court as to matters of 
form. It shall elicit the name, address, and age of 
the prospective juror and if the person: 
(i) i s a citizen of the United States; 
(ii) i s a resident of the county; 
(iii) is able to read, speak, and understand 
the English language; 
(iv) has any physical or mental disability 
impairing the person's capacity to render 
jury service; 
(v) has ever been convicted of a felony; or 
(vi) is on active duty in the military ser-
vice of the United States. 
(b) The form shall contain the person's decla-
ration that the responses are true to the best of 
the person's knowledge. It shall also include a 
statement that a willful misrepresentation of a 
material fact may be punished upon conviction 
by s fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment 
for not more than 30 days or both. Notarization of 
the form i s not required. 
(4) If a person receives a juror qualification form 
and IB not able to complete it, another person may do 
so and he shall indicate the form has been completed 
for the person to whom it was sent, the name of the 
person completing the form, and the reason for his 
completing the form. 
(5) If it appears there is an omission, ambiguity, or 
error in a returned form the clerk shall return the 
form to the prospective juror with instructions to 
make the necessary addition, clarification, or correc-
tion and to return the form to the clerk within ten 
days after i t i s received. 
(6) Any prospective juror who foils to return a com* 
pleted form as instructed shall be directed by the 
court to immediately appear before the clerk to com-
plete the form. A person who fails to appear is subject 
to the procedures and penalties in Section 7646-20. 
(7) Any person who willfully misrepresents s ma-
teria] fact on s juror qualification form for the pur-
pose of avoiding or securing service as a juror is 
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be 
fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more 
than 30 days, or both. 
(6) The names of all qualified jurors obtained from 
the list shall be placed in the qualified jury wheel 
maintained by each court and shall constitute the 
court's source of jurors for a period of time the judges 
of the court determine. 
(9) Judges of the district court and of any circuit 
court within the district may by agreement establish 
a joint qualified jury wheel from which jurors re-
quired by both courts may be drawn or pooled. isee 
76-46*13. Drawing juror panels — Notice to ju-
rors — Procedure when shortage of ju-
rors drawn — Public inspection of 
names drawn and content of qualifica-
tion forms — Exception. 
(1) Jury panels shall be drawn from the qualified 
jury wheel as needed or ordered by the court. 
(2) A judge of any court may direct the clerk of that 
court to draw and assign the number of qualified ju-
rors the judge deems necessary for one or more jury 
panels. Tnc clerk shall draw at random from the 
qualified jury wheel the number of qualified jurors 
specified. The qualified jurors drawn for jury service 
shall be assigned at random by the clerk to each jury 
panel in a manner prescribed by the court. 
(3) If s grand or trial jury is ordered to be drawn, 
the clerk shall cause each person drawn for jury ser-
vice to be notified when and where the juror is to 
report for service. The notice may be given by tele-
phone or by service of a summons, either personally 
or by first class mail which is addressed to the juror's 
usual residence, business, or post office address. 
(4) If there is an unanticipated shortage of avail-
able trial jurors drawn from a qualified jury wheel, 
the court may require the clerk of the court to sum-
mon a sufficient number of trial jurors selected at 
random by the court from the qualified jury wheel. 
(5) The names of qualified jurors drawn from the 
qualified jury wheel and the contents of jury qualifi-
cation forms shall be made available to the public 
unless the court determines in any instance that this 
information, in the interest of justice, should be kept 
confidential or its use limited in whole or in part. 
1SS6 
76-46-14. Qualified prospective Jurors not ex-
empt from Jury service. 
No qualified prospective juror is exempt from jury 
service. 1*79 
76-46-15. Excuse from jury service. 
(1) Tne court, upon request of a prospective juror or 
on its own initiative, shall determine on the basis of 
information provided on the juror qualification form 
or by interview with the prospective juror, or by other 
competent evidence, whether the prospective juror 
should be excused from jury service. The clerk shall 
enter this determination in the space provided on the 
Juror qualification form. 
(2) A person may be excused from jury service by 
the court, at i ts discretion, upon a snowing of undue 
hardship, extreme inconvenience, or public necessity 
for any period the court deems necessary. 1ST* 
76-46-16. Jury not selected in conformity with 
chapter — Procedure to challenge — 
Relief available — Exclusive remedy. 
(1) Within seven days after the moving party dis* 
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covered, or by the exerdee of diligence could hava 
discovered the grounds therefore, and in any event 
before the trial jury is sworn to try the case, a party 
may move to stay the proceedings or to quash an in-
dictment, or for other appropriate relief; on the 
ground of substantial failure to comply with this act 
in selecting a grand or trial jury. 
(2) Upon motion filed under this section containing 
a sworn statement of acts which if true would consti-
tute a substantial failure to comply with this act, the 
moving party may present testimony of the county 
clerk, the clerk of the court, any relevant records and 
papers not public or otherwise available used by the 
jury commission or the clerk, and any other relevant 
evidence. If the court determines that in selecting 
either a grand or a trial jury there has been a sub* 
stantial failure to comply with this act and it appears 
that actual and substantial injustice and prejudice 
has resulted or will result to a party in consequence 
of the failure, the court shall stay the proceeding* 
pending the selection of the jury in conformity with 
this set, quash an indictment, or grant other appro-
priate relief. 
(3) The procedures prescribed by this section are 
the exclusive means by which a person accused of a 
crime, the state, or a party in a civil case may chal-
lenge a jury on the ground that the jury was not se-
lected in conformity with this act, use 
78-46-17. Preservation of records and papers by 
county clerk. 
All records and papers compiled and msintamod by 
the county clerk in connection with the selection and 
service of jurors shall be preserved by the clerk for 
four years after the master jury wheel used in the 
selection is emptied and refilled and for any longer 
period ordered by the court. las* 
78-46-18. Compensation and travel expenses of 
jurors. 
A juror shall be compensated at the rate of $17. 
However, if he travels more than 50 miles, he shall be 
paid 25 cents a mile under Subsection 21-5-4(4) for 
the distance in excess of 50 miles in going only for 
each day of required attendance at sessions of the 
court* isse 
78-46-19. Limitations on jury service* 
In any two-year period a person shall not be re-
quired: 
(1) to serve on more than one grand jury; 
(2) to serve as both a grand or trial juror; or 
(3) to attend court for prospective jury service 
as a trial juror more than 10 court days, except if 
to complete service in a particular 
78-46-20. Peiisitiee for fsihire to appear or conv 
plete jury servicer 
A person summoned for jury service who mils to 
appear or to complete jury service as directed shall be 
ordered by the oourt to immediately appear and show* 
cause for failure to comply with the summons Any 
person who fails to show good cause for noncompli-
ance with the summons is guilty of criminal contempt 
and may be fined not more than $100 or imprisoned 
net more than three days, or both. 
78-16-21. 
(1) An employer may not deprive an employee of 
employment or threaten or otherwise coerce the em-
ployee regarding his employment because the em-
ployee receives a summons, responds to it, serves as a 
juror, or a grand juror, or attends court for prospeo-
tive jury or grand jury service. 
(2) Any employer who violates this section is guilty 
of criminal contempt and upon conviction may he 
fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more 
than six months, or both. 
(3) If any employer discharges an employee in vio-
lation of this section, the employee within 30 days 
may bring a civil action for recovery of wages lost as a 
result of the violation and for an order requiring the 
reinstatement of the employee. Damages recoverable 
may not exceed lost wages for six weeks. If the em-
ployee prevails, the employee shall be allowed a rea-
sonable attorney's fee fixed by the court isss 
Employer not to discharge or threaten 
employee for jury semlue — Criminal 
penalty — Civil action by employee. 
78-46-22. C o o t administrator's duties and re-
sponsibilities. 
If any court establishes the office of a court admin-
istrator, the court may by order provide that the re-
sponsibilities given to the court or court clerk by this 
act may be assigned to and performed by the court 
administrator. isrt 
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CHAPTER 51 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
78-61-L Utah 9Ute Ear — Qualification for 
membership. 
78-61-2. Board of commissioners — Number — 
Term — Vacancies. 
78-51-3. Territorial divisions. 
78-51-4. Number of commissioners from each di-
vision, 
78-51-5. Nomination of commissioners. 
78-51-6. Election of commissioners. 
78-51-7. Organization of board. 
78-51-8. Meetings — Annual and special — No-
tice. 
78-51-9. Bylaws. 
78-51-10. Admission to practice law — Qualifica-
tions — Enrollment — Oath — Fees, 
78-51-1L Roll of attorneys and counselors. 
78-51-12. Disciplinary proceedings — Rules estab-
lished by board — Disciplinary com-
mittees — Written response to com-
plainants — Proceedings subject to 
open meetings law. 
78-51-13. Board of commissioners — Powers — 
Conduct of members of bar holding Ju-
dicial office. 
78-51-14 Rules and regulations — Supreme Court 
to approve. 
78-51-18. Hearings and witnesses. 
78-51-16. Rights of accused. 
78-51-17. Record of proceedings 
78-51-18. Findings and report. 
78-51-19. Review by Supreme Court — Inherent 
powers of courts not affected. 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 
1. [Three departments of government] 
Section 1. [Three departments of government] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
History: Const 1896. Legislative department, Utah Const, Art 
Crots-Referenoe*. — Executive depart- VI. 
ment, Utah Const, Art VH Municipal powers not delegable, Utah 
Judicial department, Utah Const, Art VIE Const, Art VI, I 28. 
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APPENDIX II 
Transcript «i Pertinent Portion.1-., of Juror Voir Dire 
(focusing on Barber, Pike, Heap, Ludlow, Trump, and Pickering) 
ll County c :he 
2 Defendant Corey Lynn Brooks unawfully and 
3] ii I r " '" " • " » I • I i " " p o s s e s s i o n 
41 of Stephanie vi; • w: .; the use of a firearm. 
5 h 
6 Aggravated Burglar} ? n Degree Felony, at 3816 
7 West 
8 January 29, 1991, in that the defendant, Corey Lynn 
9 B r o o k s e n t e i f I «111 I i i mi i iiiiini I i i i n I i I n I I , i in I h i K f I I 
10 of Stephanie A. Vert intent to commit a theft 
111 by threaten! 
12 r t I- there any -i u * • are acquainted 
13 with this i 
14 you? 
1 5 A r e tl i u t »i " \ «>| ", ' ' , 
16 pressing or urgent business personal matters over 
3 7 then*** • om 
18 providing satisfactory jurj service over the next four 
19 days? 
20 Your name? 
21 : 
22 THE COURT: Frank what? 
2 3 : B a x I m mi II m in 1 i ir . 
24 THE COURT: What problem? 
2 5 i • 3 UROR: J 
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list my wife has had knee surgery and I'm required to 
take her for therapy three times a week, Monday, 
Wednesdays and Fridays at 5:00 o'clock in Sandy. 
THE COURT: Could other arrangements be 
made? 
A JUROR: I have been unable to so far. 
THE COURT: You are working on it? 
A JUROR: Well, she has until -- a week 
from today she goes in to the doctor to see if the 
therapy has been successful. 
THE COURT: I understand. But the 
question was: Is there any other possibility to work 
out other arrangements? 
A JUROR: I don't have anyone I could 
trust with her. 
THE COURT: What time are the therapy 
sess ions? 
A JUROR: Therapy is at 5:00 p.m. 
THE COURT: You haven't called the 
therapist to see if that could be moved back 20 or 30 
minutes? 
A JUROR: No I haven't, 
THE COURT: Ordinarily, we are in 
recess. So, if you are selected, the Court would 
appreciate having you see if that -- the time could be 
so 00269 
II c h a n g e d ; and w e ' d r e c e s s in t i m e e n o u g h to a l l o w you 
21 *- ~ d o t h a t . G i v e n t h a t a c c o m m o d a t i o : Jo you f e e l 
31 t h a t c o u l d y o u s e r v e ? 
4] A J U R O R : I am *><•>* s n r * that 
51 d e v o t e my u n d i v i d e d a t t e n t i o n tt *~^ e u n d e r the 
6] c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
7J T H E C O U R T : T h a n k y o u . 
• 8 1 , Y o u r n a m e ? 
91 ' A J U R O R : G a r y G. P i c k e r i n g . As 1 
10 s t a t e d b e f o r e , Tfirt a J e h o v a h ' s W i t n e s s , ** not a 
1 ] p r e c e d e n t . It J.& Kind of « r a;;- m a t t e r a m o n g our 
12 o r g a n i z a t i o n ••-- g i v e n ** g r e a t a m o u n t of 
13 t h o u g h t , w e i g h i n g w h a t s c r i p t u r e s s e e m wu m a k e p e o p l e 
14 g o in d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s on t h a t *~* ™ ^ c o n s c i e n c e 
15 m a k e s n t = • f eel that I s h o u 1 dn ' t d o t h a t . . **. ~ - want 
16 t h e Court, tr k n o w t h a t u p - f r o n t b e c a u s e of t i m e 
17 iriency. 
-18 TBE COURT: 1 understand. 
19 "As j u r o r s , it is y o u r f u n c t i o n to find 
20 the facts in a given case It's the Court's function 
21 ne u m p u e , b a s i c a l l y , ai*J a s s u r e that the 
2 2 •: t r i e d w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of the Rul es < : >f 
23 oceduie anu nuitb u± Evidence, and instruct 
2 4 t h e j u r y 
2 5 "Ai accept the 
si 00270| 
1 A JUROR: Education. 
2 THE COURT: Did you work outside of the 
3] home? 
4 A JUROR: No. 
5 THE COURT: What did your husband do for 
6 a living? 
7| A JUROR: He was the Murray City 
8 Treasurer. 
9 THE COURT: Is he retired? 
10 A JUROR: Yes, he is retired. 
11 THE COURT: And have you ever been on 
12 prior jury service? 
13 A JUROR: No # I haven't. 
14 THE COVPT: Have you been in court as a 
15 party or a witness? 
16 A JUROR: No. 
171 THE COURT: This is your first 
18 experience? 
19 A JUROR: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you. 
21 A JUROR: My name is Larry Pike. My 
22 wife's name is Mary Ann Pike* We have two children, 
23 ages 15 and 10; both boys. I'm an electrical 
24 engineer. T have a master's degree from the 
25] University of Oklahoma* My wife works for Federal 
35 00274 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
IS 
20 
21 
?? 
23 
24 
Express in their sales office. 
TF'i F! (7011 f s T : If • i v * • y n u L U M - I I < I H .I j u r y 
before? 
A 
jury, yes. 
THE 
JUROR v-ears. 
THE remeniL 
A JUROR a *t. 
THE COURT: 
A JUROR . _. . 
THE L - • o you remen.ber 
case or cases you were involved 
A JUROR '*»R. if invo". . irearms; not 
robbery or burglary, just possession. 
THE COURT: A criminal charge? 
A JUROR: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you recall whether there 
was an acquittal conviction? 
A : We found him ouiJiy. 
THE COURT: Did you serve on more than 
A JUROR ^ . 
THE COURT Taxrr* VO" hppn f n r f t n r f a s 
v± o w i t n e s s ? 
„ 00275 
A JUROR: No, I have not. 
THE €OURT: Other than that, you've only 
had the one court experience? 
A JUROR: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
A JUROR: My name is Shane Peck, I'm 
single. I have no kids. I am a cook at Bulwinkle's 
Bar & Grill. I've never served on jury duty. 
THE COURT: Have you been in court as a 
party or a witness? 
A JUROR: No. 
THE COURT: What is your educatior? 
A JUROR: I'm a cook at Bulwinkle's Bar 
& Grill. 
THE COURT: What is your schooling? 
A JUROR: Haven't graduated yet. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
A JUROR: My name is Daniel R. Heap. My 
wife is Evelyn. I have two kids that are both married 
now; one is 23 and 21. I work for Salt Lake County 
Fleet Maintenance for the last 20 years. 
THE COURT: Your education? 
A JUROR: High school education plus two 
years of trade tech. 
THE COURT: Does your wife work outside 
37 00276 
the home? 
A JUROR: Yes, she does. 
THE COURT: ¥u~*~ kind cf work? 
A JUROR: She
 Ao a photofinisher. 
THE COURT: w w ~ ~ - ~-
 3 j u r y 
6l b e f o r e ? 
7 A JUROR: No. 
8 THE COURT: nave 
91 party or a witness? 
10 A JUROR: No. 
11 THE COURT: This is your ":st 
12 e x p e r i e n c e ? 
13 A JUROR: 
14 THE COURT 
15 A J U R O R n a m e is A l t a L u d l o w . " an 
16 a waSti r ' J n G r u b s t a k e Pe 
17 husband's name Ludlow. He works 
181 Valley Resor: . We 
191 have a three-and-a-half-year-old daughter have 
201 never served jury duty. And x 1 
211 graduation. 
22 THE COURT: a 
231 party or a witness. 
2 4 1 JUROR • N 
2 5 THE COURT: f " " . 
38
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1 A JUROR: My name is Phyllis Geurts, and 
2 my husband's name is Arthur Geurts. We have eight 
3 children; the youngest is 18, and the oldest is 34. I 
4 have one year of college. I've been a stay-at-home 
5 mother all these years. I've never served on a jury 
6 before. 
7 And what was the other question? 
8 THE COURT: Have you been in court as a 
9 party or a witness? 
10 A JUROR: No, I haven ft. 
11 THE COURT: What does your husband do 
12 for a living? 
13 A JUROR: He is retired from the State 
14 of Utah. He does consulting in engineering out of the 
15 home. 
16 THE COURT: What did he do when he 
17 worked? 
18 A JUROR: He was a traffic and safety 
19 engineer. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you. 
21 A JUROR: My name is Karen Hall # and Ifm 
22 single. I'm employed at Surety Life Insurance as a 
23 Quality Verification Clerk. I've never served on jury 
24 duty. 
25 THE COURT: Have you been in court as a 
39 00278 
1] haven't been jury duty befo ci a?- witness. 
2 THE COU 
3 c o u r t ? 
4 A s . 
••51 T H E C O U R T I I 1 ii i, i s y o u :;i • e d u c a t i o n ? 
6 1 A / I Ii »J i 1111 ( . 
71 - T H E COURT h I I i l n l y o u r h u s b a n d d o f o r 
81 a 
91 A JUROR unemployed# medically. 
10 THE COURT 
11 A JUROR name Frank Barber My 
12 
13 Penny's
 4 -. Floor Supervisor Evans & 
14 S u t h e i ng 
15 E n g i n e e r an E n g i n e e r i n g D e g r e * t:.~ r\~I '> 
16 
171 THECOURT : II a \ e y o u b e e n i n c o u r t a s a 
19 ' A JUROR: Nc , :s i r 
2 0 Till' l" Ill I - 1 ' I " I 'II: / , 1 :; • i 
2 1 1 • THE COURT i: i c i «„ a i :> u t c h i l d r e n , do 
23l A JUROR: c h i l d r e n ; o n e 46 
2 41 a n d om I 'I 
2 5| • THE COURT: . T h a n k j o u , 
42 00281 
A JUROR: This has probably been 24 
years ago. I remember. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
A JUROR: My little boy was a baby. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
A JUROR: My name is Debra Trump. My 
husband is Darrell Trump. I work at U*S. -- no, I 
work at First Interstate Bank, and my husband is going 
to the U of U in Business Finance. We have four 
children; 11, 9, 5 and four months. 
THE COURT: Your education? 
A JUROR: One year of college. 
THE COURT: Have you been on a jury 
before? 
A JUROR: Nof just two weeks ago they 
called . 
THE COURT: Have you been in court as a 
party or a witness? 
A JUROR: I have been a witness. 
THE COURT: What kind of case? 
A JUROR: Robbery. 
THE COURT: How long ago did this occur? 
A JUROR: Eight years ago. 
THE COURT: Did that go to trial? 
A JUROR: We just came in to pick him 
51
 00290 
] on*- r, ineup, 
2 THE COURT: And were you involved 
3 subsequen 1 • p? . 
4 UROR: No. 
5 THE r RT: 3 • • whether that 
6 resulted in a plea agreement i trial? 
7 i" i i ! i a <i 
8 THE C O U R T : Any other court experience? 
9 a u g n t a 
10 forgery and had ic* him out of ineup, 
1 ] 
12 JUROR: Pleaded guilty. 
13 THE 'ience? 
14 JUROR: That f s i I . 
1 5 THI« " ! " ' i , ' ' i I | 
16 A JUROR: My name is Rae Christensen I 
?"*' am a retired teacher of "I.1" Il y e .i i. if ; J"1' then r i: 
181 v/4. physically handicapped. My. husband red 
1 9 m a i l c a r r i e r . i'« " I i i > > I -1 I - 111 i n t i l a s t 
20 year. 
21 Til I -! • ' I'1 i | educa-iun* 
2 2 JUROR years of 
231 elementary educat I < :: :n i. 
24 THE COURT: * you teach? 
2 5 * 
52 
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1 a law enforcement officer. 
2 THE COURT: Your name? 
3 A JUROR: Elaine Olsen. 
4 A JUROR: Brenda Rhodes. My cousin's 
5 husband is a policeman. 
6 THE COURT: Your name? 
7 A JUROR: Karen Carlyle. I have a 
8 retired uncle who was a policeman. 
9 THE COURT: Anyone else? 
10 A JUROR: My father - in-law, now, is the 
11 head of security for E-Systems. 
12 THF COURT: Your name? 
13 A JUROR: Alta Ludlow. 
14 THE COURT: Anyone else? 
15 A JUROR: My son was in the military 
16 police in the army. 
17 THE COURT: Your name? 
18 A JUROR: Rae Christensen. 
19 THE COURT: Are there any of you who --
2 01 assault, generally, in a civil sense, is making a 
21 verbal threat with the apparent ability to carry out 
22 your threats. Battery, on the other hand, is 
23 ordinarily an inappropriate or offensive touching, so 
24 physical contact. Within that context, have there 
25 been any of you who have been physically or verbally 
67 
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1 
21 
31 
4 
5 
6 
7 
e 
91 
10 
n 
12 
13 
15 
1 6 
17 
18 
19 
20 
211 
22 
23 
2 5 
assaulted battered? 
had 
window. 
f an i 
Your name? 
A JUROR: Alta Ludlow. Ten years ago I 
ow me out of a two-story 
TFM <„''.n.il."r , Anyone else? 
Eave any ... j__ ..-- members of your 
iends or associates that have been 
assaulted or battered? 
Your name* 
A JUROR Rachel Roatcap. Three weeks 
nose broken at a 
basketball game by a gang member. 
THE COURT: Have there any -- here's a 
hand . 
JUROR: Brenda Rhodes- My neighbor 
was married to someone who tried uu M U ner. 
THE COURT: Are there any of you who 
have been victims robbery? 
tarting down on this end, 
M r . Pickering? 
A JUROR: 4n Street, here in Salt 
Lake -- just trying think, put the years together 
i y house was robbed of items. 
THE COURT: Entry int ? 
ffi 
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A JUROR: They came into my home, 
THE COURT: That's called a burglary. 
A JUROR: I am sorry. 
THE COURT: And items were taken? 
A JUROR: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll enlarge it 
to burglaries, as well, okay? 
A JUROR: Yes --
THE COURT: Your name? 
A JUROR: Marilyn Woodside. My battery 
and my CD radio were stolen --
THE COURT: Okay. 
A JUROR: -- five or six years ago from 
my car. 
THE COURT: Anyone else? 
Your name? 
A JUROR: Rae Christensen. My 
girlfriend was robbed. She lives in West Valley. 
This case does not involve Lucille Sorenson? 
THE COURT: No. 
A JUROR: I was robbed. I was working 
at U.S. Thrift & Loan, and at gunpoint, two men came 
in and made me get on the floor and robbed the bank. 
THE COURT: And your name? 
A JUROR: Debra Trump. 
69 
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" • THE C0 UI nna ago was that? 
A JUROR: w« a a half years ago. 
THE < t . 
Other people back in here? Your name? 
A 7aomi Sandberg. My husband 
was __ __ head with w .rifle, and then 
hi 
TEE COURT: Flo%. 1 • : • i g ago has that been? 
A JUROR i I • • ::> i 1 f I e years. 
THE COURT: 1 1 ai 11 ;; ou . 
Anyo n e else? M i: s • Geurts? 
JUROR ,, wwo different occasions 
w e ' v G In , 11 •! somebody wa- " « ^ n ^  "^locked back door and 
take inj purse. 
THE COURT: nv**, 
A JUROR: „„,= „ *
 W « D a.^ f Oui 
roken into **A 4-K**? stole things. 
THE COURT: Your name? 
JUROR: Rita L u d l o w . No c~^ v->~ 
there. And then two and%a half years ago, both mine 
and my husban les were broken into four times 
*.. w..w month? windows broke out, stereos taken, 
consoles broken up. 
THE COURT: Anyone else? 
* JUROR: T,-~ u~* Daniel Heap. Xfve 
70 
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had my house broke into before, and our vehicles twice 
in the last couple of years. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
A JUROR: Larry Pike. As a child, our 
home was burglarized when we were there. 
THE COURT: Anyone else? 
If you or a member of your family were 
involved in a case such as the one before you# would 
you be willing to have your case or theirs tried by 
eight people in the same frame of mind as you are now 
in? 
Possessing the state of mind that you 
have, is there anything that would prevent any of you 
from acting fairly and impartially without prejudice 
to the substantial rights of either party in this 
case? 
Is there any reason known to any of you 
why you could not try the case fairly and impartially 
upon any evidence and without any bias for or against 
either party to the action? Other than Mr. Pickering, 
and you've indicated your feelings. 
From your answers, I understand that 
each of you individually now declares to me that you 
can listen attentively to the evidence, can apply the 
law to the facts which you may find to exist and can 
71 
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1 reach a verdict which is fair and impartial as to each 
2 party in this controversy. Are there any of you who 
3 for any reason feel that you cannot? 
41 Does the State have any additional 
5 questions? 
6| MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, sometimes 
7 jurors for various reasons find it very difficult to 
81 sit in judgment over a fellow human being. And even 
9 if the evidence were such that it would be beyond a 
10 reasonable d o u b t # would find it difficult to convict 
11 somebody. If the Court could ask that question? 
12 THE CO U R T : In our system, the juries 
13 find the fa c t s . The business of punishment is handled 
14 by the Court or through of Department of C o r r e c t i o n s . 
15 Are there any of you who have any difficulty sitting 
16 in judgment on another human being where the 
17 punishment could be incarceration in the Utah State 
181 Penitentiary, fine or other forfeiture? 
19 M r . Pickering. 
20 Anyone else? 
21 Any other questions? 
22 MR. BLAYLOCK: I don't believe so, your 
23] Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Do you pass the jury for 
2 51 cause? 
72 
MR, BLAYLOCK: If we could approach? 
THE COURT: All right. 
Does the defendants ~ does the 
Defendant have any questions? 
MR, PORTERFIELD: We do, your Honor. We 
would like to have the Court ask the members of the 
jury panel whether or not any of them would have 
difficulty acquitting a person if they were convinced 
that the State had not met its burden of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt; although, they might be inclined 
to find that there was some evidence that a crime had 
been committed, and whether the members of the jury 
could make the distinction between proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that burden of proof which the 
State might present which meets that level of proof? 
THE COURT: In our system, defendants 
are charged with crimes by a document we call an 
information* The fact that the Defendant stands 
charged of a crime creates no presumptions. You are 
to draw no inferences, therefrom. He has a 
presumption, constitutionally, that he is presumed to 
be innocent. The burden is upon the State of Utah to 
prove each and every element of the alleged crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Would any of you, if not persuaded to 
73 
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that level of conviction, have any difficulty 
acquitting a defendant in a case such as this? 
A JUROR: I could not, Judge, your 
Honor• 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Pickering. 
Any other questions, Mr. Porterfield? 
MR. PORTERFIELD: I don't think so, your 
Honor. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Would both attorneys 
approach the bench? 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE COURT: We'll be in brief recess. 
I'll allow you to leave and go to the restroom. But 
remember to mark your chair with an "X" so you can 
keep track of where you are sitting. We need to keep 
you in the same order. 
There's some of you who we are going to 
call in to chambers. Don't wander too far away* If 
your name is called, we would like you to come in to 
chambers and pursue the voir dire privately. 
MR. PORTERFIELD: Pardon me, your 
Honor. For the convenience of the witnesses who I 
don't believe we are going to call today, might I 
excuse them? 
THE COURT: You may. 
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MR. PORTERFIELD: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Just step out, and we'll see 
you in chambers. 
(In chambers.) 
THE COURT: Mrs. Geurts. Mr. Blaylock 
indicates your husband was a witness in a case. 
Tell us a little bit about the case. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: He was witness in a case 
where Dan Jenson's son was killed. Do you remember 
that? Last summer? Did he talk to you? It was a 
crosswalk. The boys were walking across a crosswalk, 
and got hit by a driver. 
A JUROR: Was that out in Sandy? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: It was out in Sandy. 
A JUROR: I remember him being on that. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: He was a witness for the 
other side. 
Also, I -- I lived in your area for 
awhile, and I believe you are in the same stake. 
A JUROR: That's right. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: 33rd Ward? 
A JUROR: Okay. I am living in the 11th 
Ward. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I wasn't sure that you 
were aware of that relationship. I was the attorney 
75 
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for the prosecution on the case when your husband 
testified for the Defense. 
A JUROR: I did not know that. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: You weren't aware of 
that? 
THE COURT: All that he just told you# 
does that make a bit of difference to you? 
A JUROR: No. 
THE COURT: You feel that you could 
fairly and impartially serve? 
A JUROR: Yes# I think I could. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions? 
MR. PORTERFIELD: Yes, thank you. 
You don't believe that the references 
that Mr. Blaylock's made to your husband's testimony 
or the fact that you might have been associated 
through the church would have an effect on you? 
A JUROR: No. 
MR. PORTERFIELD: Okay. Thank you very 
much . 
(Phyllis Geurts leaves, Debra Trump comes in.) 
THE COURT: Mrs. Trump, you indicated 
during the voir dire to the Court that you were a 
victim of a robbery. 
A JUROR: Y e s . 
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THE COURT: Can you just go through the 
details, tell us how long ago, the place of 
employment, again, the circumstances? 
A JUROR: You bet. It was in -- let's 
see, I thought it was eight years ago, but it is nine 
years ago, in American Fork, U.S. Thrift & Loan* And 
the manager had just left. He was going to buy us all 
lunch. There was just three of us that worked there. 
He left. And he was gone about -- he just probably 
got out of -- you know, quite aways away. And two 
gentlemen came in and pulled out a gun and said: 
"We'd like all your money.* And he told me to get on 
the floor, and told the other girl to clean all the 
money. They didn't want any coin. And then: "Don't 
get off the floor until we are far enough" -- you 
know, for so much time. Then we got up, and they were 
gone, and we called the police. 
THE CODRT: Given that experience, do 
you feel that you could listen attentively to the 
evidence in this case, consider only the evidence in 
this case, follow the Court's instructions on the law 
and reach a fair and impartial verdict? 
A JUROR: Yes, I do* 
THE COURT: Mr* Blaylock, do you have 
any additional questions? 
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1 MR. BLAYLOCK: No. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Porterfield? 
31 MR. PORTERFIELD: Mrs. Trump, I 
4 understood from your answers to the questions out in 
51 the courtroom that you've had a couple of experiences 
61 with lineup procedures? 
7 A JUROR: Two. 
81 MR. PORTERFIELD: And in doing those 
91 lineup identifications -- those were two different 
10 cases --
11 A JUROR: Yes. 
12 MR. PORTERFIELD: -- I believe you said. 
13 And I believe you said that there were two convictions 
14 that resulted as a result partly of your 
15 identification? 
16 A JUROR: Well, the forgery was just 
17 about a year ago* I work at a drive-up window at the 
181 bank. And he used a fake I.D. It wasn't him. We got 
191 the drivers license, and then we picked him out of the 
20 lineup. 
21 MR. PORTERFIELD: Do you recall going 
221 through the lineup procedure, going through that? 
23 A JUROR: Yes, I do. 
24 MR, PORTERFIELD: Do you feel that 
251 that's a particularly reliable way of picking out --
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1 A JUROR: In our case, it was. And I 
21 knew him, you know. 
31 MR* PORTERFIELD: You say you knew 
4 him --
5 A JUROR: I didnft know him, but I knew 
6 that that was him without a doubt. 
7 MR. PORTERFIELD: And out of those two 
8 experiences then -- and you were also, I believe --
9 you said you were -- you said you were robbed at 
10 gunpoint. 
11 A JUROR: Yes. 
12 MR. PORTERFIELD: You have been a 
13 witness to a robbery. That was the same -- one in the 
14 same case? 
15 A JUROR: Yes. 
16 MR. PORTERFIELD: So they were all tied 
17 together. And, basically, you've been involved in at 
18 least two procedures that involve lineups, and then 
19 convictions and witness -- you being a witness? 
20 A JUROR: Yes. 
21 MR. PORTERFIELD: Okay. I donft think I 
22 have anything further. 
23 THE COURT: Given that lineup 
24 experience, do you feel that you can impartially 
25 serve? 
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ll A JUROR: Yes, I do. 
21 THE COURT: Anything else? 
3j Thank you. 
41 Anyone else? 
51 (Discussion off the record) 
6 (Debra Trump leaves, Alta Ludlow comes into chambers.) 
7 THE COURT: You have been a, victim of 
81 crimes on a number of occasions. Can you just go 
9 through some of that again a little bit to refresh our 
10 recollect ions? 
11 A JUROR: When I was about 13, our house 
12 was broken into, and a lot of our things were taken. 
13 1 remember coming home to the doors open, and looking 
14 for -- walking in and just seeing everything a mess, 
151 and feeling, you know, hurt. And then my mom came 
161 home, and she was really upset. We called the police, 
17 and they couldn't get fingerprints, or anything. 
181 Then I had a real close friend who kind 
191 of went off the deep end one day and tried to throw me 
201 off a two-story window. It was in my mother's house. 
211 She was home. So were my two little sisters. It did 
22] cause me to have a breakdown. It was really 
23 traumatic. 
24] And then our cars being broken into, 
251 that was, I think -- you know, that was just really 
I 80 
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hard# in one month, four times, both vehicles. We 
moved, but, you know, itfs just - - it can only get so 
far away. 
THE COURT: Given those experiences, do 
you feel that you can listen to the evidence presented 
in this case, apply the Court's instructions on the 
law, reach a fair and impartial verdict in this case? 
A JUROR: I really don't know. I mean, 
just talking about it makes me feel kind of sick. I 
think if somebody tried to hurt me, or, you know, if I 
were to put myself in, say, the victim's 
circumstances, I might just decide because I know how 
it feels. 
THE COURT: Mr. Blaylock. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I have no reason to 
excuse -- I mean, I have no objection. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions? 
MR. PORTERFIELD: Thank you, your 
Honor• 
Being a victim is a terrible thing. 
There's a tendency sometimes to assume that there's 
retribution that can be gotten when you -- someone is 
convicted -- charged with a crime, rather. Based on 
what you said, do you think that there might be a 
tendency on your part to emotionally -- and 
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understandably so -- but emotionally react on the 
facts of this case, and maybe cloud your judgment a 
little bit about whether or not you could decide my 
client's guilt or innocence independent of that 
reaction that you talked about, that sick feeling? 
A JUROR: It would be hard. Ifll be 
honest • 
MR. PORTERFIELD: Thank you very much. 
That's what we want you to be. We appreciate it. 
A JDROR: I don't want to convict 
someone just because of how I feel. 
MR. PORTERFIELD: But you think that 
there might be a tendency. 
THE COURT: Thank you; appreciate it. 
(Alta Ludlow leaves, Steve Schreier comes in.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Schreier, during the 
voir dire, you indicated you served on one military 
court of justice and had also experience with guns. 
And in your employment, you were involved in security 
kind of work, is that true? 
A JUROR: That's affirmative. 
THE COURT: Do you want to just outline 
some of that again briefly for us. 
A JUROR: I hesitate to detail any 
intricacies that were involved because of that 
82 
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ll I don't have anything else. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. 
31 Anyone else? 
4 MR. PORTERFIELD: I don't believe so, 
51 your Honor. 
61 MR. BLAYLOCK: We are done. 
7 THE COURT: Any objection to taking Alta 
8 Ludlow off by consent? 
9 MR. BLAYLOCK: No. 
10 THE COURT: You agree? 
11 MR. PORTERFIELD: Absolutely, your 
12 Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Does the State pass the jury 
14] for cause? 
15 MR. BLAYLOCK: With that exception, with 
161 the understanding that she's excused. Number 17. 
17 THE COURT: Does the Defendant pass the 
18 jury for cause? 
191 MR. PORTERFIELD: We dof your Honor, 
2Oi with the same exception. We did have -- ohf I suppose 
21 Pickering we should mutually agree to strikef is that 
22 okay with you? 
23 THE COURT: Well# we won't get that low, 
24 but I've stricken him. 
25 MR. PORTERFIELD: Okay. 
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APPENDIX III 
Contingent Motion to Supplement Record with Barber Affidavit 
and 
Affidavit of Juror Frank Barber 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
J, KEVIN MURPHY (5768) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
Attorneys for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
STATE'S CONTINGENT MOTION TO 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD ON 
APPEAL, AND SUPPORTING 
V. I MEMORANDUM. 
COREY LYNN BROOKS, x Case No. 920853-CA 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
Plaintiff-Appellee State of Utah, through counsel, 
hereby makes this contingent motion to supplement the record on 
appeal with the Affidavit of Frank R. Barber, who was a juror in 
the trial of this case. The original affidavit has been 
submitted to this Court with this motion; a copy is attached to 
the copy of this motion that is served upon defendant's appellate 
counsel. The State's Brief of Appellee is filed and served 
concurrently with this motion. 
MEMORANDUM 
THE AFFIDAVIT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR FULLY-
ADVISED RESOLUTION OF THIS APPEAL. 
Defendant Brooks's leading point on appeal consists of 
an argument the juror Frank Barber was "incompetent" by virtue of 
a schedule conflict. The conflict involved Mr. Barber's need to 
transport his wife to physical therapy appointments. Because of 
the conflict, Mr. Barber asserted, "I am not sure that I could 
devote my undivided attention to the case . . ." (Br. of 
Appellant at 7-8). Although the trial court urged Mr. Barber to 
make arrangements to resolve this conflict (id,.), the present 
record on appeal does not reveal whether Mr. Barber did so. 
In response to defendant's argument on appeal, the 
State argues that Mr. Barber was neither "incompetent" nor 
"biased" under the governing legal principles, such that there 
was neither "plain error" nor "ineffective assistance of counsel" 
stemming from the trial court's and counsel's decisions to not 
excuse Barber for cause (Br. of Appellee at 13-16). The State is 
confident in the legal merit of this argument. However, if this 
Court does not accept the State's argument, the State believes it 
would be appropriate and desirable to supplement the record on 
appeal with juror Barber's affidavit. 
In his affidavit, Mr. Barber recounts that upon being 
selected to sit as a juror in this case, he did in fact make 
arrangements to eliminate the conflict posed by his duty to his 
wife. Under Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it 
appears appropriate to inform this Court of this fact, which did 
not find its way into the original record. See, e.g.. Sampson v. 
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App.) (counsel must provide 
appellate court with all evidence relevant to issues on appeal), 
cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). 
The State recognizes that it is unusual to obtain post-
trial evidence from jurors. In the interest of protecting juror 
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privacy, and particularly the privacy of juror deliberations, the 
State does not wish to encourage such practice as a matter of 
routine. This case, however, presents unusual circumstances for 
two reasons: First, the legal issue advanced by defendant on 
appeal appears to be one of first impression in Utah, such that 
this Court's resolution of it cannot be predicted with certainty. 
Second, this prosecution for aggravated robbery and burglary has 
already gone through two full trials, the first of which ended in 
a hung jury. It appears that the robbery victim, Stephanie Vert, 
was rather badly frightened by the robbery-burglary (see R. 450-
51, where Ms. Vert needed a recess to proceed with testimony; R. 
457-58, describing her upset in the aftermath of the robbery 
(these transcript excerpts are attached to this motion)). 
Against the contingency that this Court may be 
dissatisfied with the State's legal analysis upon the present 
record, the State, in the interest of protecting the victim from 
further traumatization in a possible third trial, asks that juror 
Barber's affidavit be received into the record. That affidavit 
further supports the State's argument that any possible error in 
seating juror Barber did not cause prejudice to defendant* 
Supplementation of the record with Mr. Barber's affidavit will 
not be necessary if this Court accepts the State's primary legal 
argument, based upon the presently-constituted record; hence the 
"contingent" nature of this motion. 
As a contingent motion, the State believes that 
resolution of it can properly await plenary consideration of this 
3 
appeal. Therefore, absent an objection from defendant, or 
contrary direction from this Court, the State does not request a 
ruling on the motion at this time. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ & day of March, 1993. 
j^ _ 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Motion and Supporting Memorandum was mailed, postage 
pre-paid to ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
attorneys for defendant-appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this day of March, 1993. 
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ATTACHMENTS 
(Barber Affidavit and Transcript Excerpts) 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ROGER S. BLAYLOCK, Bar No.0367 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
-vs-
COREY LYNN BROOKS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Frank R. Barber, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That I was a juror in the District Court trial of Corey 
Lynn Brooks on March 24 through March 27, 1992. 
2. That I realize I have no obligation to comment on my 
jury service, but I am doing so willingly. 
3. That on the first day of the trial before I was 
selected as a juror, X told Judge Rigtrup that ay obligation to 
take my wife to therapy for her knee might distract me making it 
difficult for me to devote my undivided attention to the case 
being tried. 
4. That Judge Rigtrup asked me to see about making other 
arrangements for her to get to therapy, so during the break for 
lunch after I had been selected as one of the jurors to hear the 
AFFIDAVIT OF JUROR FRANK R. 
Barber 
Case No. 920853-CA 
case and before any of the witnesses had testified, I postponed 
the appointments until the next week. 
5. That Judge Rigtrup inquired of me if he could have the 
bailiff take my wife for the therapy so I informed him that it 
was not a problem as I had made other arrangements for her 
therapy. 
6. That I was not hampered in my deliberations by concern 
for my wife's therapy appointment as I resolved that problem 
before I heard any testimony or began deliberations with the 
other jurors. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 19933. 
Frank R. Barber 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /f day of March, 
-TOttL TESTIAWO* OF STEPUAN3i£ V/ECT I 
Q. What did he say besides '•This is the roan 
that wants to purchase the ring"? 
A, He said that he was running late# and 
that he wouldn't be at the house until 9:00 o'clock. 
And then we hung up the phone. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. I got up and started to get ready for 
work • 
Q. What happened then? 
A. I was upstairs in the bathroom, and I 
heard a knock at the front door. So I walked down the 
stairs, and opened the door# and I glanced over at the 
oven -- it has a clock on it -- to see what time it 
was • 
Q. What time was it? 
A. It was 8:57. 
Q. What happened then? 
A. I let him In the house. And it was cold 
outside --
Q. You say you let him in the house. tfho 
was it? 
A. Corey, the man that's sitting right 
there. 
Q. How was he dressed? Just take your 
time. 
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A. He had. . • 
THE COURT: Would you like a brief 
recess? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Could we? 
THE COURT: We will be in recess for 
five minutes. 
(Jury Admonished & Recess.) 
THE COURT: You may resume the stand. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Are you okay now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I asked you how Corey was dressed. 
A. He had a black jacket on, black Levi's, 
a black pair of boots, a black hat and some glasses 
that had a rainbow lens on them, and they were 
florescent green. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: May I approach the 
witness? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Would you look at what's 
been marked as State's Proposed Exhibit No. 4? 
Can you identify that? 
A. These are the glasses that he wore the 
morning he came to my house. 
Q. How can you recognize that? 
A, With the rainbow lenses and the 
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1 florescent green and the way they are shaped. They 
21 are like goggles, almost? ski glasses. 
31 Q. Now, you say "rainbow/ what did you 
41 mean by that? 
5 A. Well, the different colors. It has like 
6 a purple and green. When it hits the light, you can 
7 see blue and yellow. 
81 Q. Changes in the light? 
91 A. I would say, yes. 
101 MR. BLAYLOCK: May I approach the 
11 witness? 
121 TEE COURT: You may. 
13 MR. BLAYLOCK: Would you look at what's 
14] been marked State*s Proposed Exhibit No. 7? 
15 Would you identify those? 
16 A. They look like the black boots he was 
17 wearing. 
181 Q. The boots he was wearing. Were they 
19 cowboy boots? 
2CJ A. Yes. They were cowboy boots? pointed 
21 toe. 
22 Q. After you saw him at the door there, 
231 what happened? What did you do? 
24] A. I turned to walk into the kitchen, and 
251 he followed me. Be immediately asked where the ring 
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A. Yes* That's when I noticed I could 
unscrew the pipes, I could slip the handcuff off the 
pipe. And by that time, the phone was ringing again, 
and I picked up the phone. And it was my mom. And I 
told her that he had a gun and to call the police. 
And then I hung up the phone because I was so upset. 
I just kept hanging up the phone. 
The phone rang again, and it was someone 
that my mom worked with, and they tried to keep me on 
the phone, and again I just told them to call the 
police and hung up the phone. 
Q. Did your mom arrive? 
A, It was about six minutes later when she 
arrived at the house. As soon as she walked in the 
door, she picked up the phone and called the police. 
They couldnft get a free line out at her work. 
Q. How long had Corey been in the house? 
A. Twelve minutes, because when I walked 
upstairs after having the handcuffs on, I noticed the 
clock. It was about ten or eleven minutes after 
9:00. 
0. Did the police come? 
A. Yes, they did. 
Q. Bow long was it after your mother 
arrived that the police arrived? 
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A. I don't remember. I was so upset I 
couldn't --
Q. Do you recall how long you were upset 
during the day? 
A. Two weeks? I missed quite a few days of 
work, and found it hard to go anywhere. 
Q. What do you mean? 
A. Just when you trust people, no one can 
be trusted. When I go into public places, I'm afraid. 
Q. Is that still today? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell us what this gun looked 
like that he had? 
A. It was black, and I could tell that the 
magazine went in the hand part of the gun. And it had 
a small, silver rim protruding out from the barrel of 
the gun. 
Q. A small, silver --
A. Rim. 
Q. Rim. You said that was from the front 
of the gun? 
A. The barrel, the end of the barrel. 
Q. Did you see Corey again after the 29th 
of January of last year? 
A. We were called for a lineup. We were 
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